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The banking literature has established that banks can alleviate information asymmetries between
lenders and borrowers, while the Q literature has used cash flow sensitivity analysis to test whether
financing constraints hinder investment. This paper investigates whether bank ties in Japan were
costly for mature and healthy firms in the 1980's and 1990's, and whether banks continued to
facilitate investment once non-bank financing options became available. Using the explicit bond
issuing criteria to solve the endogenous firm-sorting problem, I measure the investment-cash flow
sensitivity of Japanese firms, and find it lowest for those firms known to have faced bond market
constraints. I then find that the spread in sensitivity was much larger for main bank client firms, once
bond market access is controlled for. This result, coupled with results on the relative profitability
and bond activity of bank-affiliated firms, is consistent with banks capturing the net benefits of
relationship lending during the period of bond market deregulation.
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The relationship banking literature postulates that close bank ties can mitigate the asym-
metric information and moral hazard problems that aﬄict public capital markets. Related
with this, the Q literature has interpreted excessive correlation between a ﬁrm’s investment
and its internal net worth as evidence of ﬁnancing constraints.1 Combining these literatures,
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) (hereafter HKS91) investigate the investment-cash
ﬂow sensitivity of bank aﬃliated and independent ﬁrms in Japan, and provide evidence that
strong ties helped to alleviate liquidity constraints. Since the Japanese asset market collapse,
a body of work has emerged which focuses on the associated costs of “main banking”. This
paper builds on this literature by examining the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity of Japanese
manufacturing ﬁrms, and uses the explicit bond issuing criteria in a simple test of whether
ﬁrms enjoyed positive net beneﬁts from close bank ties in the 1980’s and 1990’s.
While many have shown that banks can act as eﬀective ﬁrm monitors, bank dependence
may be costly to ﬁrms if banks use their market power to extract rents (Sharpe (1990)
and Rajan (1992)). If close bank ties are costly for mature and healthy ﬁrms, should we
still expect banks to facilitate investment? Do banks retain their ability to lower cash ﬂow
sensitivity when outside ﬁnancing options are introduced? Can exogenous changes in the
ﬁnancing environment be used to determine which party enjoys the beneﬁts of relationship
banking? This paper addresses these questions, and highlights the importance of properly
addressing endogenous ﬁrm-sorting issues in empirical investment-Q work.
The empirical work on cash ﬂow sensitivity has struggled with the problem of isolating
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.2 Ideally, exogenous criteria indicative of ﬁnancing constraints
should be used to sort ﬁrms before comparing sensitivity across groups. Often, however,
empirical work is forced to rely on behavioral characteristics which can lead to endogenous
sample selection problems. Japan is a natural place to address this issue both because of its
historical reliance on large domestic banks in corporate ﬁnancing (the “Main Bank” system),
and because of the government regulation of the capital markets for much of the post war
period.3 Throughout the 1980s, ﬁrms had to meet explicit criteria set by the government in
1Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Oliner and Rudebusch (1992), Chirinko (1993), and Kaplan and
Zingales (1997).
2See Hubbard (1998) for discussion.
3Reviewing the Japanese Main Bank system, Aoki (1994) noted, “In postwar Japan, the main bank
system has been the main pillar of corporate monitoring and governance, compensating for the lack of more
2order to issue bonds in the domestic market. These bond criteria can be exploited in empirical
work to isolate constrained ﬁrms, and serve as a partial solution to the endogeneity problem.
Using these criteria, I ﬁrst show that sensitivity was lowest for those ﬁrms that were
restricted from the bond market during the 1980’s, a result very much at odds with the
standard prediction in the Q literature. That is, the investment of ﬁrms known to have
faced capital market restrictions was less sensitive to measures of internal net worth than
that of ﬁrms with a wider range of ﬁnancing options. This result survives several robustness
tests, including controls for negative observations as outlined in Allayannis and Mozumdar
(2001), and may indicate that sensitivity analysis is not an appropriate technique for iden-
tifying ﬁnancing constraints. However, restricted ﬁrms were, by deﬁnition, bank-dependent,
meaning the results presented here are consistent with both established theory with HKS91.
As eﬀective ﬁrm monitors, banks may have facilitated the eﬃcient use of capital, and
helped ﬁrms to achieve and maintain their ﬁrst-best investment path. On the other hand,
high monitoring costs may have meant that ﬁrms paid a premium for bank ﬁnancing. In
a more sinister scenario, banks may have enjoyed information monopolies, or market power
from the remaining capital controls, that allowed them to extract rents through higher
interest rates, compensating balance requirements, or pressure to over-borrow (Weinstein
and Yafeh (1998)). This is of particular concern because of the gradual nature of bond
market deregulation; banks may have been able to capitalize on their market power over
ﬁrms that did not meet the bond criteria. Thus, the results introduced above do not provide
clear evidence on whether bank ties were a net beneﬁt to ﬁrms. Sensitivity may have been
lower for restricted ﬁrms because they enjoyed better access to funding (from close banks),
but possibly with high “indirect” costs. Alternatively, sensitivity may have been driven by
artiﬁcially high loan ﬂows if ﬁrms were pressured to borrow.
Splitting the sample using both a standard proxy for main bank aﬃliation and the bond
criteria sheds light on this issue. As in Hoshi et al. (1990b), this section implicitly hypoth-
esizes that if ﬁrms enjoyed a positive net beneﬁt from close bank ties, sensitivity should be
lower for bank-aﬃliated ﬁrms, regardless of bond market access. In addition, there should
be some ex post observable diﬀerence in performance between aﬃliated and independent
ﬁrms that reﬂects the beneﬁts of bank ties. If the net beneﬁt accrued to banks (because
of high monitoring costs or rent extraction) then bond-eligible, main bank client ﬁrms may
arm’s-length market-oriented means such as the takeover mechanism, and probably obviating a need for
them to develop.”
3have had a stronger incentive to move to bond ﬁnancing, even if this increased the likelihood
of asymmetric information problems. In other words, the implications of higher sensitivity
may have been more palatable to ﬁrms than the bank relationship.
The evidence presented here supports the latter case. For the four ﬁrm groups, sensitivity
was highest for main bank client ﬁrms that had access to the bond market in the 1980s,
and lowest for main bank client ﬁrms that did not. That is, the spread in sensitivity was
larger for bank-aﬃliated ﬁrms than for independent ﬁrms once external ﬁnancing options
are introduced. In addition, bank-aﬃliated ﬁrms accessed the bond market more often, and
with (slightly) larger issues than did independent ﬁrms, despite their lower proﬁtability.
The results are consistent with banks capturing the rents from main bank ties. With
deregulation, mature and healthy ﬁrms chose to reduce bank dependence, implying that
internal ﬁnancing (and its associated costs) was less than the cost of a main bank relationship.
Importantly, these results do not imply that ﬁrms never beneﬁted from having a main bank.
Indeed, it is often argued that the bank centered ﬁnancial system was an important factor
behind Japan’s rapid growth prior to the mid-1970’s, and only became obsolete once Japan
reached the technological frontier. The lack of outside ﬁnancing options in this earlier period
precludes the ﬁrm division proposed in this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature
on cash ﬂow sensitivity analysis, with emphasis on recent papers that question its validity,
as well as the empirical work on main banking in Japan. Section 3 presents the empirical
methodology, discusses the bond eligibility criteria in place in the 1980s, and describes the
data. Section 4 presents the empirical results using standard cash ﬂow sensitivity analysis,
and robustness checks based on diﬀerent ﬁrm sorting mechanisms, data samples, and model
speciﬁcations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity
The Modigliani-Miller theorem implies that a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial structure does not matter for
investment decisions. Absent ﬁnancing constraints, all positive net-present-value investment
projects are ﬁnanced, and arbitrage within and across ﬁnancial markets makes irrelevant the
mix of ﬁnance sources. However, capital markets are not perfect, and information asym-
4metries may mean managers are unable to credibly convey the internal worthiness of their
investment projects to public markets.4
Starting with Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) (hereafter FHP88), a large literature
has emerged that uses investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity to investigate ﬁnancing constraints.
The central idea is as follows. Firms use a mixture of internal and external funds to ﬁnance
investment, but ﬁnancing constraints drive a wedge between the cost of these funds. With
a large enough wedge, investment will vary not only with the availability of positive net-
present-value projects (as captured by Tobin’s Q), but also with ﬂuctuations in internal
funds.5 Presumably, ﬁnancing constraints can be measured by comparing the sensitivity
of investment rates to cash ﬂow across diﬀerent classes of ﬁrms that are a priori assumed
constrained. Firms that are the most constrained should display a higher sensitivity, as they
are forced to use internal funds to maintain optimal investment.6
Several recent papers question the validity of this approach. Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
(hereafter KZ97) reexamine the “constrained” ﬁrm group used in the FHP88 study, and
show that within this group, sensitivity is highest for those ﬁrms that are the deemed uncon-
strained. They challenge the implicit assumption that the sensitivity of investment to cash
ﬂow increases monotonically with the degree of ﬁnancing constraint, the so called “mono-
tonicity hypothesis”.7 They argue that the ambiguity of the theory which establishes the
relationship between external ﬁnancing constraints and the sensitivity of investment to in-
ternal funds implies that it is ultimately an empirical issue. Cash ﬂow may act as a proxy
for investment opportunities not captured by Tobin’s Q, and do so diﬀerently for diﬀerent
groups of ﬁrms. Despite their ﬁndings, their analysis has been criticized because of small
sample size.8
4Asymmetric information can cause the costs of internal and external ﬁnance to diverge (Greenwald,
Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984)). Also see Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), Jensen
and Meckling (1976), and Hart and Moore (1995).
5See Hubbard (1998) and Chirinko (1993). Note that this methodology can detect ﬁnancing constraints,
but says nothing about their source (either agency costs or asymmetric information).
6FHP88 use dividend payouts to sort ﬁrms. Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) ﬁnd sensitivity highest for
young ﬁrms, and ﬁrms susceptible to insider trading. Schaller (1993) shows sensitivity is highest for young
manufacturing ﬁrms with a dispersed ownership structure. Chirinko and Schaller (1995) use aﬃliation with
a corporate group, ﬁrm age, and whether the ﬁrm is in the manufacturing sector.
7In their critique of FHP88, KZ97 use letters to shareholders and supplementary notes to track the inci-
dence of liquidity problems and reclassify ﬁrms. In a simple model, they show that whether the monotonicity
hypothesis is satisﬁed depends on the ratio of the second derivatives of the production and the ﬁnancing cost
functions.
8Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (2000) defend the original FHP88 results by arguing that the KZ97
5Cleary (1999) reexamines this issue using a large sample of U.S. ﬁrms and a sorting index
derived from six ﬁnancial variables. In agreement with KZ97, he ﬁnds that unconstrained
ﬁrms have the highest cash ﬂow sensitivity. He draws support for this result from Mayer
(1990), who empirically demonstrates that internal funds are the predominant source of
ﬁnancing for all ﬁrms (implying a correlation between liquidity and investment), and Jensen
(1986), who argues that managers have an incentive to grow ﬁrms beyond their optimal size.
Recently, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2001) have overturned these critiques of cash ﬂow
sensitivity analysis. Using the data from both the KZ97 and Cleary (1999) studies, they
investigate whether the results in each are driven by negative cash ﬂow observations. They
argue that ﬁrms with negative cash ﬂow have driven investment down to its lowest possible
level, making it unable to respond to further reductions (or small ﬂuctuations) in cash ﬂow.
This reduces the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity for these observations. After correcting for
this, they conclude that the Cleary (1999) results no longer hold, and the the KZ97 results
are driven by a few inﬂuential observations and small sample size. Reaﬃrming the original
FHP88 results, cash ﬂow sensitivity is highest for those ﬁrms that are a priori assumed
constrained.
The evidence to date suggests that sensitivity analysis may be useful in detecting ﬁnancial
constraints, but lacks the rigorous theoretical backing required to determine their source. In
this paper, I present evidence using this approach for the purpose of reexamining Japanese
main bank relationships, but rely on what are arguably exogenous criteria to sort ﬁrms.
Further I show that the results presented here survive the robustness check proposed by
Allyayannis and Mozumdar (2002).
2.2 The Case of Japan
“Main banking” has been at the core of the post war Japanese ﬁnancial system, and as such
has received considerable research attention.9 A substantial portion of this research has
model does not adequately capture the role of cash ﬂow in investment decisions. Kaplan and Zingales (2000)
reply to this critique by pointing out that the model analysis in Fazzari et al. (2000) fails to include second
order eﬀects.
9To name but a few in a large literature, Kaplan (1994), Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Morck and
Nakamura (1999) analyze the appointment of outside directors from main banks to corporate boards. Prowse
(1990) suggests that bank ownership can prevent wealth transfers from debt to equity holders, while Prowse
(1992) shows that the top shareholders of main bank client ﬁrms do not take larger positions in cases where
greater control might improve ﬁrm performance, presumably because banks have other means by which
monitor management. Sheard (1989) argues that banks replace the takeover mechanism in arms-length
6focused on the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity of Japanese ﬁrms, typically in the context
of assessing the beneﬁts of aﬃliation with large domestic banks. In their seminal paper
in both the Japan and Q literatures, HKS91 examine a panel of 145 manufacturing ﬁrms,
and ﬁnd that ﬁrms with strong bank ties exhibited signiﬁcantly lower investment-cash ﬂow
sensitivity than did independent ﬁrms. Since main banks acquire inside knowledge of client
ﬁrm’s investment opportunities, the asymmetric information problems that force ﬁrms to
rely on internal funds for investment are reduced.
While main bank client ﬁrms may enjoy access to capital, bank aﬃliation can be costly.
Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) argue that information monopolies or market power allow
banks to extract rents. If a ﬁrm is known to be bank-aﬃliated, it may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to raise
ﬁnancing elsewhere since public capital markets may interpret this as bank refusal to extend
credit because of some adverse private information. Thakor (1996) suggests that ﬁrms can
seek ﬁnancing from several sources to eliminate the threat of being held up or denied credit.10
In Japan, deregulation during the 1980’s provided ﬁrms with alternative funding sources
for the ﬁrst time in the post war era. This expansion of non-bank ﬁnancing options led to
increased heterogeneity in capital structure across ﬁrms which researchers have been able to
exploit in identifying the costs of bank aﬃliation.11 Hoshi et al. (1990b) examine the shift
toward non-bank ﬁnancing for a sample of 109 ﬁrms, and ﬁnd sensitivity higher for ﬁrms
that decreased their reliance on bank debt. This suggests that the net beneﬁt to ﬁrms of
bank aﬃliation may have been negative (at least in this period) since these ﬁrms presumably
could have maintained close bank ties after deregulation.12
Others have also investigated whether ﬁrms enjoyed net beneﬁts from close bank ties,
particularly during the 1970’s and 1980’s. Horiuchi et al. (1988) found no evidence of risk
sharing between banks and their client ﬁrms, while Caves and Uekusa (1976), Nakatani
(1984), Kang and Shivdasani (1999) and Weinstein and Yafeh (1995, 1998) all show that
credit markets. Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) investigate the positive and negative eﬀects of
bank ownership on ﬁrm value. See Aoki (1994) for a thorough discussion of main banking in Japan. For a
more recent treatment of the Japanese ﬁnancial system, see Hoshi and Kashyap (2001).
10Ongena and Smith (2000) empirically show that multiple bank relationships can alleviate the hold-up
problem, but that they limit the availability of credit.
11See Hoshi et al. (1993) and Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) for discussion on the development of the bond
market.
12The authors speculate on the nature of the costs of bank aﬃliation. Banks may require higher rates
of return because of reserve requirements, and may require a premium on loans, which are less liquid than
publicly traded debt. In addition, ﬁrms may incur indirect costs if banks (as debt rather than equity holders)
encourage excessively conservative investment policies.
7bank-aﬃliated ﬁrms performed worse than independents on a variety of proﬁtability mea-
sures, suggesting that the beneﬁts of bank relationships are not internalized by the ﬁrm.13
In a more direct test, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) estimate a model where banks can in-
ﬂuence ﬁrm investment through shareholding, and force ﬁrms to borrow as though their cost
of capital is lower than it actually is. They argue that bank pressure induced artiﬁcially high
loan ﬂows and ineﬃcient investment strategies that possibly led to the over-capitalization of
client ﬁrms in the 1980’s. Consistent with their story, the deregulation of the bond market
led to a deterioration of the bank’s traditional customer base during the 1980’s. In addition,
banks were initially prevented from entering the underwriting business, which meant fewer
proﬁt opportunities as banks were left with unused deposits.14 Regulated banks lacked the
human capital to properly assess the risk of individual investment projects, and started lend-
ing to smaller, less well known ﬁrms, often based on land collateral values. Indeed, the bad
loans that emerged after the market collapse have remained (undisclosed, for the most part)
on the books of most Japanese banks.15 In such an environment, it is not inconceivable that
banks pressured those ﬁrms over which they retained market power to borrow more than
was economically eﬃcient, particularly if the government implicitly guaranteed solvency.
More recently, Hayashi (2000) re-examines the HKS91 ﬁrm sample (with diﬀerent data),
and after excluding outliers, ﬁnds no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the cash ﬂow sensitivity of
bank-aﬃliated and independent ﬁrms.16 In fact, in some of the reported regressions, the
point estimate on cash ﬂow sensitivity for main bank ﬁrms is larger than for independent
ﬁrms (although the diﬀerence is statistically insigniﬁcant).17 While this discrepancy may
ultimately be driven by econometric technicalities, it does cast a shadow on the robustness
13Nakatani (1984) also ﬁnds that the variance of ﬁrm proﬁtability is less for aﬃliated ﬁrms than for
independent ﬁrms, suggesting that main banks serve as an “insurance policy” by implicitly committing to
extend credit in times of ﬁnancial distress in exchange for rents collected when the ﬁrm is healthy. This
result is later challenged by Beason (1998).
14This restriction was relaxed in 1993 (Hoshi and Hamao (2000)). For a discussion of the “Big Bang”
deregulation in the 1990s, see Hoshi and Kashyap (1999).
15Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) estimate the cost of the bad loan problem in the 1990s to be roughly 7% of
GDP, several times the size of the U.S. savings and loan crisis.
16The diﬀerence in the data used in the HKS91 and Hayashi (2000) studies is of some relevance here.
HKS91 use data from the Nikkei needs database, which does not contain capital stock data by asset type.
The JDB data used in the Hayashi (2000) study (and in this paper) contains a detailed breakdown of asset
types and gross depreciation which allows for more accurate calculation of the real capital stock. For details
on this issue, see the appendix of this paper and Hayashi and Inoue (1991).
17Hoshi (2000) counters the Hayashi (2000) critique by showing that if the data is corrected systematically,
the earlier results still hold.
8of the original HKS91 results, and calls for further investigation.
Building on this literature, this paper investigates the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity of
Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms in the 1980-96 period. While similar in spirit to Hoshi et al.
(1990b), it makes use of a larger panel, uses the more detailed data described in Hayashi
(2000), and uses the bond eligibility criteria as an exogenous ﬁrm sorting mechanism. In
addition, it relies on recently developed empirical techniques, and carries the analysis of
cash ﬂow sensitivity and proﬁtability into the 1990’s when bond market deregulation was
complete.
3 Empirical Methodology
The empirical procedure employed here is similar to that used in HKS (1990b, 1991) and
Hayashi (2000), but incorporates alternative model speciﬁcations taken from recent papers
in the Q literature, and uses a variety of empirical methodologies in order to control for
measurement error. The goal here is to (a) examine the relative sizes of cash ﬂow sensitivity
for ﬁrms with and without access to bond ﬁnancing in order to establish the robustness of
the HKS91 results, and (b) estimate sensitivity for main bank client ﬁrms after controlling
for these outside ﬁnancing options. As argued below, this latter query serves as a simple
test of whether ﬁrms enjoyed positive net beneﬁts from bank aﬃliation once bond ﬁnancing
became available.
3.1 Model Speciﬁcation
The empirical analysis relies on the standard Q equation from the dynamic optimization
problem facing the ﬁrm each period, and I brieﬂy review its derivation here. Firms are
assumed to chose It (investment net of sales of existing capital) subject to capital adjustment
costs, and an accumulation constraint on capital, K.











− (c + νi,t)
#2
Ki,t−1 (1)
where c is the (constant) target investment rate, and νi,t is a stochastic shock that contains
both ﬁrm and period speciﬁc eﬀects. Ii,t is investment during period t, and Ki,t−1 is the
capital stock at the beginning of period t. This functional form is a more general case of
9that most often used in the literature (where β = 0), and is used in Love (2000) and Sekine
(1999). Ideally, current investment should not depend on lagged investment. However, if
ﬁrms ﬁnd it diﬃcult to cancel investment projects once they are started, investment rates
will exhibit persistence across periods not explained by movements in Q. Also, a positive β
can capture some reductions in adjustment costs as ﬁrms learn to “work around” investment
activity that normally upsets the production process. Since investment has been shown
to be persistent over multiple periods, I test for this possibility by examining the size and
signiﬁcance of β.
The derivation of the standard investment equation requires that the conditions laid out
by Hayashi (1982) hold, namely that production and adjustment costs are constant returns
to scale, and that capital markets are perfect. The inclusion of regressors correlated with
the internal net worth of the ﬁrm are a method of testing this last assumption. Only when
ﬁnancing constraints exist (and only if the “monotonicity hypothesis” as outlined in KZ97
holds) would we expect signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on such regressors.
Rearranging the ﬁrst order conditions from the maximization of a dynamic proﬁt function
which contains the adjustment cost function speciﬁed above yields the standard equation in
the literature, to which some measure of the ﬁrm’s net worth is added as a regressor.
Ii,t
Ki,t−1












+ γcfCFi,t + νi + µt + ￿i,t (2)
Qi,t is beginning of period average q, CFi,t is some measure of cash ﬂow, τt is the corporate
tax rate, Pt and P I
t are the beginning of period output and capital prices, respectively, c is
the target investment rate, and α is the adjustment cost parameter.
In the derivation of equation 2, the (Qt − 1) on the right hand side is valid only under
the assumption that there is no measurement error in the ﬁrm speciﬁc price ratio. Of
course, the available data for capital and output prices is the same across industries, which
precludes capturing ﬁrm level variation. Abel and Eberly (1996) suggest a correction for this
by allowing the coeﬃcient on the price ratio to deviate from 1
α. Thus, I insert a separate
parameter, γp, on the regressor
PI
t
(1−τt)Pt, which is expected to be negative.
A well documented problem in the literature is measurement error resulting from using
average Q in place of marginal q.18 For Japan, the predominant concern was the asset
appreciation that occurred during the late 1980s, which means that stock values used to
18See Erickson and Whited (2000) for a discussion of measurement error problems. Cummins et al. (1999)
use earnings forecasts from securities analysts to construct more accurate measures of the fundamentals
10calculate the numerator of Q may contain “bubble components”. Goyal and Yamada (2001)
have proposed a correction for this by deconstructing Q into its fundamental and speculative
parts. Thus, following their framework, Q is regressed on two lags of sales growth and sales
growth squared (in separate regressions for each year) and a full set of industry dummies.
The predicted dependent variable from each regression is taken as fundamental Q, and the
residuals as the non-fundamental part.19
Combining these modiﬁcations, the base estimation becomes
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
































i,t are the beginning of period fundamental and non-fundamental parts of
Q, respectively. For comparison with the literature, I estimate this equation using OLS and
ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions in which β is assumed to be zero, and Q, as opposed to its
decomposition, is used as a regressor. Equation (3) is then estimated using the Arellano-
Bond GMM estimator, which allows for instrumentation of the current period regressors
using lagged values.
3.2 Data Description
The ﬁrm data is from the ﬁnancial database of the Japan Development Bank, which contains
very detailed accounting data on all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms listed on the various stock exchanges
in Japan from 1956 to 1997. The availability of price data restricts the sample to manu-
facturing ﬁrms, which is then balanced from 1980 to 1996.20 All ﬁrms that changed their
that aﬀect the expected returns to investment. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) assume the marginal
productivity of capital follows a VAR process, and use numerous variables to forecast the future proﬁtability
of investment. Laeven (2001) simpliﬁes this by assuming that the current period marginal productivity and
ﬁnancial variables proxy for Q.
19Using this technique, the coeﬃcients on Q are slightly larger and more signiﬁcant than the standard
case, but the relative sizes of the other parameters are preserved. In deconstructing Q, a variety of regressors
were tried including lags (and squared lags) of Opperating Profits/Kt−1, Opperating Profits/TAt−1, and
Net Revenue/Kt−1. These speciﬁcations did not alter the results.
20Firms in the mining, agriculture, and utility industries are dropped. The Japanese ﬁscal year ends in
March. However many ﬁrms ﬁle late in the year, and in April and May (with few ﬁrms ﬁling in the summer
months), making June the appropriate month to divide the calendar data into ﬁscal years. Thus, the ﬁscal
year (FY) for a particular observation is the previous year if the ﬁrm ﬁles before, and the current year if the
ﬁrm ﬁles after June.
11accounting period over these years, ﬁrms with values of Q above the 99.5 or below the .05
percentile, and ﬁrms with I/K above the 99.5 percentile are dropped, leaving a ﬁnal sample
of 446 ﬁrms.21
The construction of the variables used in the econometric analysis is similar to that in
Hayashi and Inoue (1991), and a detailed description is available upon request. The JDB
data contains a detailed breakdown of ﬁve depreciable asset types, as well as asset speciﬁc
gross and current period depreciation. This allows for an estimate of the market value of
assets sold or retired to be calculated, which means that the investment rate net of asset
sales can be used. As discussed in Hayashi (2000), this (possibly) leads to more accurate
capital stock and investment measures than studies that rely on data from the Nikkei data
tapes, which contain only aggregate capital measures.
It is unclear whether or not land should be included in investment and the capital stock.
Obviously, land is used in the productive process and should show up in the production
function. However, land speculation during the asset appreciation period may have had
nothing to do with production. Japanese law permits ﬁrms to carry land at historical rather
than market value, and as a non-depreciable asset, the reported land values are very poor
measures of both the physical land owned by the ﬁrm, and the portion of that land actually
used in production. A perpetual inventory method is used to generate a measure of the
market value of land based on Hoshi et al. (1990) and Hayashi and Inoue (1991). The
problem with including this measure in the production function is that the rise in land
prices over the 1980s was not necessarily based on its marginal productivity, which means
the contribution of land would be over estimated. Thus, investment and the capital stock
are constructed based on a separate recursive process for the ﬁve depreciable assets, and
average Q is adjusted for the market value of land by subtracting it from the ﬁrm’s market
capitalization in the numerator.
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of investment and Tobin’s Q for the sample of ﬁrms.
Both Q and I/K are relatively ﬂat during the 1980-87 period, before the asset inﬂation began.
Starting in ﬁscal year 1988, both rose dramatically and peaked in 1990. From 1991 to 1993,
both collapsed, before settling at lower levels in the 1994-96 period. For comparison, ﬁgure
21The elimination of ﬁrms based on extreme values of I/K helps to rule out mergers and acquisitions.
A constant accounting period is necessary because although the calculations of K and Q are unaﬀected,
the investment level reported on the balance sheets may be downward biased in shorter periods, which will
systematically change its correlation with Q.
123 shows the distribution of total loan growth for all listed Japanese banks.22 Loan growth
rose to 20% a year during the asset appreciation period, and then collapsed in the 1991-93
period, just as ﬁrm investment rates fell.
3.3 Firm Sorting
Following the literature, the sample was divided using a priori criteria that are indicative of
ﬁnancing constraints. Examples used elsewhere include dividend payout rates, ﬁrm age, ﬁrm
size, or membership in a corporate group. However, criteria based only on ﬁrm characteris-
tics, such as dividend payments for example, implicitly assume that such a “choice” variable
is suﬃciently correlated with the degree of ﬁnancing constraints. Some ﬁrms may choose
not to pay dividends for reasons that have nothing to do with ﬁnancing constraints, and the
lack of additional ﬁrm speciﬁc information usually means that these ﬁrms are incorrectly
lumped into the “constrained” group. Fortunately (for this analysis), bond issues in Japan
were heavily regulated throughout the 1980s, and this can be exploited as an exogenous ﬁrm
sorting mechanism.
3.3.1 Bond Eligibility Division
The ﬁrm sorting technique is similar to that in Anderson and Makija (1999). First, the num-
ber of years between 1980 and 1990 in which a ﬁrm was eligible to issue secured convertible
bonds was calculated based on the criteria in table 1.23 Firms were then divided into three
groups based on the 33rd and 66th percentile of the total number of periods of eligibility
using the sample of all listed manufacturing ﬁrms. The cutoﬀ levels are one and four; thus,
those ﬁrms that were eligible to issue bonds at most one period are considered “restricted”
(R ﬁrms), those that were eligible 2-4 periods are “semi-restricted” (S ﬁrms), and those that
were eligible ﬁve or more periods are “unrestricted” (U ﬁrms). This yields 116 R ﬁrms, 105
S ﬁrms, and 225 U ﬁrms.24
22The data used to construct this ﬁgure uses all City, Trust, Long-Term Credit, and Regional banks
available in the Nikkei Zaimu database.
23The criteria for secured convertible bonds is used because the criteria for other bond types was more
severe. For example, the bottom of table 1 lists the criteria for secured strait bond issues.
24The sample is balanced over 1980-96, although the eligibility criteria were in place until 1990. It would
be preferable to use the minimum credit rating requirement after 1990, but this data is not available.
Furthermore, this may introduce an endogeneity problem since ﬁrms that could have issued bonds (after
1990) may have chosen not to, and thus would not have a credit rating. These ﬁrms would be incorrectly
13Using this sorting mechanism, R ﬁrms faced known ﬁnancing constraints since, relative
to S and U ﬁrms, they could not access the domestic bond market in the 1980s.25 Thus,
if the monotonicity hypothesis holds, R ﬁrms should display higher investment-cash ﬂow
sensitivity than either S or U ﬁrms, and this diﬀerence should be largest in the 1980s when
the bond restrictions were actually in place.26 This is the view as presented in the Q and
cash ﬂow literature, but the situation in Japan requires a more subtle analysis.
If bank relationships did reduce ﬁnancing costs through the acquisition of inside infor-
mation or monitoring, R ﬁrms may have actually faced lower ﬁnancing costs than ﬁrms that
relied on arms-length debt ﬁnancing. This is the central idea behind the HKS91 study and
the subsequent Hayashi (2000) critique.27 On the other hand, the beneﬁts of relationship
banking may have accrued to banks if they extracted rents. If true, then internal ﬁnancing,
and the associated costs evidenced by higher sensitivity, may have been more palatable to
ﬁrms than maintaining the bank tie. In addition, meeting the eligibility criteria increased
the ﬁrm’s bargaining power vis-a-vis the bank, and may have reduced the ability of the bank
to inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s loan position (Weinstein and Yafeh (1998)). Thus, cash ﬂow sensitiv-
ity may appear lower for bank-dependent ﬁrms (R ﬁrms) because investment responded to
perverse loan ﬂows which reduced its correlation with internal funds.
Table 3 breaks down by year the incidence of actual bond issues for each ﬁrm group. Two
items are noteworthy. First, the share of U ﬁrms that actually issued bonds increased from
about 15% in 1980, when deregulation began, to 43% by 1989. Second, there is a jump in
included in the constrained group.
25 There are a few ﬁrms that issued bonds in periods in which they were supposedly ineligible to do so,
either because they received special permission from the Kisaikai (bond underwriting cartel), or because the
issues were ﬂoated on foreign markets. Unfortunately, the data does not provide any information on this.
There are two ways to ensure that the results presented in later pages are not driven by these ﬁrm-year
observations. First, any ﬁrm that had a bond issue in a period in which it was supposedly ineligible was
eliminated. Second, ﬁrms were treated as eligible in such periods, which shifted a few toward the S and U
groups. Neither of these robustness checks altered the results.
26As with all studies in this literature, there is a concern about whether ﬁrms self select by altering
behaviour to target the eligibility criteria, thus making the sorting mechanism endogenous. This is diﬃcult
to analyze directly, but analysis of why ﬁrms failed provides convincing evidence that the use of these criteria
is appropriate. Table 2 breaks down the criteria failure by year. The single largest failure reason was ﬁrm
size, followed by low earnings per share. These are not really choice variables since ﬁrm managers are unlikely
to be able to signiﬁcantly alter ﬁrm size in the short run, and should be maximizing shareholder value each
period regardless of bond eligibility.
27Since the division is not conditioned on whether ﬁrms actually issued bonds, then it is not necessarily
the case that U ﬁrms were bank-independent, as a ﬁrm could have been eligible all years, and yet never
issued bonds. If bank ties imply lower ﬁnancing costs, this would reduce the measured cost for the U group,
and bias away from ﬁnding a signiﬁcant role for banking relationships.
14the number of bond issues in 1989 and 1990 for R ﬁrms, while the number of S and U ﬁrms
that issued bonds decreased dramatically in 1990 and again in 1992. This suggests that the
regulations were binding for at least some ﬁrms.
Tables 4 and 5 present summary statistics using the eligibility division. U ﬁrms are larger
based on any size measure (only real sales and total assets presented in the table). For all
three ﬁrm groups, investment rates, Q, sales growth, operating proﬁts, and cash ﬂow all
peak in 1988-90, which corresponds to the asset inﬂation period. In all four periods, U ﬁrms
generally have the highest investment rates, Q, cash ﬂow (normalized by P IK), operating
proﬁts, and sales growth, although the diﬀerences across groups narrows in the 1990s as a
result of the freer capital markets, as well as the market crash that reduced demand for all
ﬁrms. What is important here is that on every measure used in other studies to divide ﬁrms
into constrained and unconstrained groups (i.e., division based on size, bond issues, dividend
payout rates, etc.), the relative ranking of the R, S, and U ﬁrms is preserved, even after the
bond issuing criteria were lifted in 1990.
The biggest diﬀerence across groups is their reliance on bank debt. The last panel of
table 5 shows that mean bank debt over total liabilities was about 40% for R ﬁrms, but
was less than half that for U ﬁrms, with an even larger diﬀerence in medians. This can be
seen more clearly in ﬁgures 4 and 5. Figure 4 displays by year the mean outstanding bonds,
and ﬁgure 5 displays the mean bank debt for each ﬁrm group, both normalized by total
liabilities. All three ﬁrm groups reduced their dependence on banks from the early 1980s to
the late 1980s, but more so for U and S ﬁrms. R ﬁrms actually increased their reliance on
bank debt through about 1987, after which they too moved to bond ﬁnancing in response
to the relaxation of the eligibility criteria in that year (see table 1). After the asset market
crash, bank ﬁnancing again became more important for all ﬁrms groups and bond ﬁnancing
leveled oﬀ.
3.3.2 Keiretsu Division
The second ﬁrm division employed is membership in an industrial Keiretsu, or corporate
grouping centered on one of the City Banks.28 Eight editions of Dodwell Marketing Con-
sultant’s Industrial Groupings in Japan were used to classify ﬁrms. Group membership may
mitigate information problems since long-term relationships with other ﬁrms, as well as with
28This includes the Industrial Bank of Japan group which is technically not a City Bank.
15the group’s bank, may introduce reputational eﬀects that facilitate credible communication
of investment projects to other members of the group. There were 250 independent ﬁrms
(denoted I ﬁrms), and 196 group ﬁrms (denoted G ﬁrms).
All studies on Japanese main banking struggle to identify ﬁrms that have main bank
relationships, and generally use published rosters as a starting point.29 Miwa and Ram-
seyer (2001) argue that the horizontal bank groups, or Keiretsu simply never existed, but
rather “...began as a ﬁgment of the academic imagination, and they remain that today.”
In their view, ﬁrm rosters were conceived by Marxists committed to locating “domination”
by “monopoly capital” in the 1960s, and became a key part of academic studies as scholars
tried to “search for culture speciﬁc group behavior in Japan.”
The restrictions on the bond market, however, were real, and make it easy to identify
those ﬁrms that were bank-dependent out of necessity. If the eﬀects of main banking were
as pervasive as the literature would have us believe, then this looser deﬁnition of bank
dependence should provide substantial evidence on the debate between HKS91 and Hayashi
(2000), and is explored in section 4. Despite its frequent use in the literature, Keiretsu
membership is not a perfect measure of main bank aﬃliation, as some ﬁrms may have
business ties with other member ﬁrms, but actually rely primarily on non-bank ﬁnancing.
However, the use of the the bond issuing criteria in conjunction with Keiretsu membership
is a partial solution to this problem since member, bank-dependent ﬁrms can be isolated.
Thus, the R, S, and U ﬁrm groups created using the bond eligibility division are further
divided based on Keiretsu membership. R (and S) ﬁrms that were Keiretsu member ﬁrms
most likely had signiﬁcant bank relationships, whereas member U ﬁrms had the option of
non-bank ﬁnancing. The cross-group names are IR, IS, IU for independent restricted, semi-
restricted, unrestricted ﬁrms respectively, and GR, GS, and GU for the corresponding group
ﬁrms.30
Keiretsu ﬁrms were generally larger when measured on sales and total assets (sample
statistics omitted for brevity). However, there was virtually no diﬀerence in terms of I/K,
29Another publication is the Keiretsu no Kenkyu published by the Keizai Chosa Kyokai (Economic Survey
Association). Both of these classify Keiretsu ﬁrms based loan structure, bank share holding, and historical
factors. However, the Keiretsu no Kenkyu publication is problematic because it does not distinguish between
horizontal (bank group) and vertical (subcontracting) groups. Using the Dodwell listing, less than 4% of
the ﬁrms in the sample switch into or out of their Keiretsu group over the sample period. Rather than
eliminate these, they are classiﬁed as group ﬁrms if they were listed for at least half the sample period, and
independent otherwise.
30There are 60 IR, 61 IS, 129 IU, 56 GR, 44 GS, and 96 GU Firms.
16Q, and sales growth, although cash ﬂow and operating proﬁts were higher for independent
ﬁrms ﬁrms in most periods. The biggest diﬀerence between the groups is again their relative
reliance on bank debt. Bank debt normalized by total liabilities was generally about 5%
higher for G ﬁrms than for I ﬁrms in all four periods. This diﬀerence in bank dependence is
much smaller than when using the bond eligibility criteria, and suggests that the Keiretsu
division by itself may be a noisy measure of main bank aﬃliation.
4 Empirical Analysis
Using a variety of empirical methodologies, the standard Q equation including a cash ﬂow
term was estimated using a sample of 446 Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms for the 1980-90, and
1980-96 periods. In the OLS and ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions, β is assumed to be zero (lagged
I/K term dropped) for empirical reasons, and for comparison with the standard equation in
the literature. The results are presented in tables 6-18.
In the bottom panel of each table, equation 3 was estimated using a GMM estimator
based on Arellano and Bond (1991), which allows for simultaneous determination of the
explanatory and dependent variables. Thus, the explanatory variables can be assumed only
“predetermined” instead of the stronger assumption of strict exogeneity required in OLS
and ﬁxed-eﬀects models. This is accomplished by using a speciﬁed lag for each explanatory
variable as instruments in a standard GMM estimation, which does not require assumptions
about the distribution of the error term.
Firm ﬁxed-eﬀects are eliminated by ﬁrst diﬀerencing the equation, and requires that
all instruments be dated t − 2 and earlier.31 GMM, and the use of lagged regressors as
instruments, may be a signiﬁcant improvement over the OLS and ﬁxed-eﬀects models since
the coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow in these models may be driven by contemporaneous correlation
with the error term. Controlling for this reduces the likelihood that cash ﬂow measures
simply proxy for future proﬁtability not captured by Q.32
31 In all GMM regressions, the price ratio is assumed strictly exogenous. In regressions where the coeﬃcient
on cash ﬂow is estimated for the entire sample period, three ﬁrst-diﬀerenced lags are used as instruments
(although diﬀerent lag structures yielded almost identical results). In regressions where the coeﬃcient is
estimated separately for each sub-period, a single ﬁrst-diﬀerenced lag is used. All other regressors are
instrumented with their entire past history (t − 2 and earlier).
32The validity of the GMM model is tested using the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, and
the M test for second order serial correlation. The p − values for both tests are presented in each table.
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are reported for OLS and GMM regressions. Only with a
17It not clear what the correct deﬁnition of cash ﬂow should be. Most papers in the
literature use current period cash ﬂow deﬁned as end of period earnings minus dividend
payments plus accounting depreciation (CF1). However, there is evidence that dividend
payments are “sticky” since reputation eﬀects may make it costly for ﬁrms to lower dividends
even during periods of ﬁnancial distress. Dividends are a choice variable, and thus should
not necessarily be subtracted from earnings. Thus, I use a second measure of cash ﬂow (CF2)
deﬁned as operating proﬁts plus accounting depreciation minus taxes paid. In addition to
adding back in dividend payments, the diﬀerence in these deﬁnitions is that non-operating
revenue/expenses, extraordinary proﬁts/losses, and special dispositions and provisions are
excluded from proﬁts.33
In all regression tables, rather than label the estimates as in equation 3, their corre-
sponding variable names are used for simplicity. Thus, LAGIK corresponds to β, and is the
coeﬃcient on the lagged investment term, PRAT corresponds to γp, and is the coeﬃcient
on the price ratio, CF corresponds to γCF, and is the coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow normalized
by P I
t Kt−1, and Q corresponds to 1/α, and is the inverse of the adjustment cost param-
eter. In the GMM regressions, Q and Qnf are the coeﬃcients on the fundamental and
non-fundamental parts of Q (as described in section 3.1) respectively.
4.1 Cash Flow Sensitivity-Bond Eligibility Division
Cash ﬂow sensitivity analysis, in its broadest sense, implies that R ﬁrms, which faced known
ﬁnancing constraints, should display higher sensitivity than U ﬁrms. Previous empirical
work on Japan, however, suggests a special role for Japanese banks in corporate governance.
Since R ﬁrms are also, by deﬁnition, the most bank-dependent, the a priori expectation on
the relative sizes of sensitivity across groups is ambiguous.
The top panel of table 6 presents the estimation of the base equation using the pooled
sample, with CF1 added as the cash ﬂow measure. Q is insigniﬁcant in the OLS model
(with time and industry dummies), but becomes highly signiﬁcant in the ﬁxed-eﬀects and
homoskedastic error term does the Sargan statistic follow an asymptotic chi-squared distribution. To correct
for this, the p−values reported for the Sargan tests are from the two-step estimator, while the coeﬃcients and
robust standard errors are calculated with the one-step estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend
using one-step estimators for inference, and several studies have found that the two-step standard errors
downward biased in small samples.
33The special dispositions and provisions are somewhat peculiar to the Japanese accounting system. See
the appendix for a discussion of these items.
18GMM regressions (time dummies included in both). Furthermore, the point estimate using
GMM is over twice as large as the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimate, suggesting that the dissection of Q
into its fundamental and non-fundamental parts helps to correct for the eﬀects of the asset
appreciation period. That said, the estimates on Q still imply unreasonably large adjustment
costs, a common result in the literature. As expected, PRAT, the coeﬃcient on the price
ratio, is negative (and marginally signiﬁcant) in all three models, and the point estimates of
CF are comparable to values found elsewhere, and are very signiﬁcant.
Since passing the bond eligibility criteria implies a wider range of ﬁnancing options,
investment should be less sensitive to cash ﬂow in those ﬁrm-year observations where the
eligibility criteria were met. To test for this, the second panel of table 6 includes the inter-
action of CF1 and a dummy for whether the ﬁrm was eligible in a particular year, with a
corresponding coeﬃcient, CFxELIG. Since CF1 is also included, the total sensitivity for
ﬁrm-year observations when the ﬁrm was eligible is the sum of CF and CFxELIG. In all
three regressions, CFxELIG is positive and signiﬁcant, implying that sensitivity was higher
when ﬁrms passed the eligibility criteria.34 The rest of this section explores alternative spec-
iﬁcations to determine whether cash ﬂow sensitivity is indeed higher for less bank-dependent
ﬁrms.
Table 7 presents the results for each of the R, S, and U groups separately. Since R ﬁrms
passed the eligibility criteria at most once, while U ﬁrms passed at least 5 times during the
1980s, cash ﬂow sensitivity should have been highest for R ﬁrms. All coeﬃcients have the
expected signs, and, again, the coeﬃcient on Q is larger after correcting for measurement
error in the GMM estimation. The most striking result is the relative size and signiﬁcance of
the coeﬃcients on cash ﬂow (using CF1). In all three regressions, sensitivity was highest for
U ﬁrms and lowest for R ﬁrms, with S ﬁrms falling somewhere in the middle. The diﬀerences
in the point estimates, and the t statistic (z statistic for GMM) for these diﬀerences, are
listed in the last column, and are signiﬁcant at standard levels.35
34Note, however, that the p−value of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is quite low, implying
that the instrument set is highly correlated with the residuals. Thus, one possible explanation for these odd
results is that the OLS and ﬁxed-eﬀects models are biasing the coeﬃcients on CF1 because of its correlation
with the error term, and, in this particular case, the GMM estimator has failed to reverse this bias.
35The regressions from table 7 were repeated using CF2 in place of CF1. Maintaining a certain level of
dividends per share is one of the issuing criteria. Thus, if ﬁrms were targeting dividend rates for the purpose
of issuing bonds, CF1 may distort sensitivity values. Since, presumably, U ﬁrms were better able to target
the bond criteria because of their larger size, dividend payments may have been less discretionary than for
R ﬁrms, which were more likely to have failed other criteria. This may have reduced the cash ﬂow directed
toward investment in a systematic way, and raise the sensitivity for these ﬁrms. However, the pattern in
19Table 8 presents the results after interacting the cash ﬂow regressor (CF1) with a dummy
for whether the ﬁrm issued bonds in a particular year. Like the eligibility dummy interaction
in table 6, the coeﬃcients on this interaction term should be negative since CF1 is included
separately. Firms should rely on internal funds less in years when they issue bonds, thus
reducing the correlation between cash ﬂow and investment.36 This is not supported by the
results. In all three regressions, CF is signiﬁcant, with U ﬁrms again displaying the highest
sensitivity. In the OLS and ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term
is positive and signiﬁcant in the pooled regression (ﬁrst column), as well as in each group
regression. In the GMM regression, the coeﬃcient is positive for both R and S ﬁrms, and
signiﬁcant for R ﬁrms. Again, the diﬀerence in the base cash ﬂow term between U and R
ﬁrms is everywhere signiﬁcant at all standard levels.
If the theory underlying cash ﬂow sensitivity analysis is correct, that is, the monotonicity
hypothesis as formulated by FHP88 and KZ97 is actually satisﬁed, then some ﬁrm charac-
teristic must explain why ﬁrms known to have been restricted had lower sensitivity. This
diﬀerence was possibly bank dependence. In accordance with the original HKS91 results,
bank aﬃliation reduces ﬁnancing constraints, and is revealed in lower investment-cash ﬂow
sensitivity. By deﬁnition, R ﬁrms were more bank-dependent, and if bank relationships mat-
ter, the seemingly backward results are justiﬁed. The troubling aspect of this explanation is
that unrestricted ﬁrms could have remained bank-dependent, a point ﬁrst raised in Hoshi et
al. (1990b). If banks were so good at solving asymmetric information problems, why did the
largest and most proﬁtable ﬁrms move to the bond market? Banks should have been more
willing to lend to these ﬁrms, and yet these ﬁrms chose to reduce bank dependence. This is
explored further in the next section.
A second possibility is that the incidence of negative cash ﬂow observations drives the
results. Allayannis and Mozumdar (2001) argue that ﬁrms with negative cash ﬂow have
driven investment down to its lowest possible level, making investment unable to respond
to ﬂuctuations in cash ﬂow. This reduces sensitivity for those ﬁrm groups with the largest
number of negative cash ﬂow observations, and is an important robustness check since their
work using U.S. data reversed the KZ97 and Cleary (1999) critiques, and empirically reaf-
ﬁrmed the validity of sensitivity analysis. This is of particular concern in this study because
the bond eligibility criteria used in ﬁrm sorting does include performance thresholds. As
table 7 survives this robustness check, and these tables have been omitted for brevity.
36This also serves as a robustness check relating to the classiﬁcation problem described in footnote 25.
20shown in table 9, R ﬁrms had the highest incidence of negative cash ﬂow observations in
the 1980s. This may artiﬁcially lower the measured cash ﬂow sensitivity for these ﬁrms, and
thus would explain the “backward” results.
Table 10 presents the results where negative cash ﬂow observations were separated from
positive observations and given a separate coeﬃcient. The pattern described above emerges
for the positive cash ﬂow observations, and, as expected, the coeﬃcients on the negative
observations are generally negative, but everywhere insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcients on pos-
itive cash ﬂow observations are generally larger for all three ﬁrms groups relative to their
corresponding values in table 7, suggesting that the inclusion of negative cash ﬂow observa-
tions does reduce sensitivity. However, this change is consistent across ﬁrm groups, and the
diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients on positive cash ﬂow are signiﬁcant in all three regressions.
A third possibility is that cash ﬂow merely proxys for future proﬁt opportunities not
captured by Q. If true, U ﬁrms, with their higher sales growth and operating proﬁts, would
naturally display higher sensitivity. However, this seems unlikely. The sample statistics
show that the large disparity between R and U ﬁrms (in terms of cash ﬂow and operating
proﬁts) present in the 1982-87 period narrows considerably by the early 1990s. The level of
Q for R ﬁrms is on par with that for U ﬁrms by the 1988-90 period, and remains so in the
1991-93 period. Sales growth for R ﬁrms is about one third that of U ﬁrms in the earlier
period, but is virtually equal across all three groups in the 1988-90 and 1991-93 periods.
The year-by-year sample statistics (not presented) for R ﬁrms shows that the gap in Q,
operating proﬁts, and investment rates narrows consistently over the 1980s. In addition, the
relationship between ﬁrm proﬁts and the magnitude of sensitivity is not consistent. When
the sample is split using main bank aﬃliation and bond eligibility, the sensitivity is actually
larger for ﬁrm groups that do not have the highest proﬁts or cash ﬂow values. This point
will be discussed in detail in the next section.
Other robustness checks that were conducted but not reported include:
1. Polynomials in Q: Since I/K may react non-linearly to movements in Q, or because
cash ﬂow measures may be proxying for future proﬁt opportunities not captured by Q,
squared and cubed terms of Q were included in the base equation. The coeﬃcient on
Q became slightly more signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcients on the higher order terms were
generally insigniﬁcant. In all speciﬁcations, the cash ﬂow sensitivity pattern described
above was preserved.
212. Investment in Land: As described earlier, land is diﬃcult to measure properly because
of the discrepancy between the market and book values, and increases in market value
in the 1980s were not necessarily correlated with changes in its marginal productivity.
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the market value of land in I and in K (and thus Q) did
not reverse the sensitivity pattern.
3. Firm Division: The three ﬁrms groups were redeﬁned several times, each time adjusting
the number of periods in which a ﬁrm had to be eligible to be included in a particular
group. As the eligibility count was moved up for R ﬁrms, and down for U ﬁrms
(squeezing out S ﬁrms), the diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients on cash ﬂow between the R
and U ﬁrms narrowed. The diﬀerence increased slightly when those ﬁrms that were
eligible at most once (currently included in the R group) were transferred to the S
group.
4. Expanded Sample: The current sample was chosen by dropping those ﬁrms that changed
their accounting period at least once between 1990-96. Dropping this restriction nearly
doubles the sample, from 446 to 724 ﬁrms, with 188 R ﬁrms, 173 S ﬁrms, and 363 U
ﬁrms. The pattern of the coeﬃcients on CF1 across groups was unaﬀected, although
the coeﬃcients on Q were more often insigniﬁcant.
This section has presented evidence that either bank dependence matters, or cash ﬂow
sensitivity analysis is ﬂawed. If the latter, then it is diﬃcult to say anything concrete about
the eﬀect of bank ties on investment behavior. If the former is true, then it appears that
the use of the bond eligibility criteria to determine bank dependence yields far more robust
results than the “roster” deﬁnitions used elsewhere, and lends support to the original HKS91
empirical results (vis-a-vis Hayashi (2000)). However, the question of why the largest and
most proﬁtable ﬁrms left their banks needs to be addressed before concluding that lower cash
ﬂow sensitivity for bank-dependent ﬁrms implies that ﬁrms enjoyed a positive net beneﬁt
from close bank ties. Before turning to this issue, I brieﬂy explore sensitivity in the 1990s
after the bond market regulations were lifted.
Several scholars have tested for a credit crunch during the early 1990s under the suspicion
that banks cut lending after the asset market crash.37 In the current analysis, higher cash
37Gibson (1995, 1997) uses a Q model and bond ratings to show that ﬁrm investment did not react to
bank health in 1994-95, and was only slightly aﬀected in the 1991-92 period. Sekine (1999) inserts both
22ﬂow sensitivity for any or all ﬁrm groups in the 1991-93 period would be indicative of a credit
crunch. Table 11 presents the results where negative and positive cash ﬂow observations are
separated, and a separate coeﬃcient is estimated for each of four time periods. U ﬁrms
consistently had higher sensitivity than R ﬁrms, even when negative cash ﬂow observations
are accounted for.
However, there is virtually no evidence of a credit crunch for this sample of ﬁrms. R and
S ﬁrms were the smallest and the least proﬁtable, and being relatively bank-dependent, had
the most to lose from a contraction in lending. Yet for these groups, cash ﬂow sensitivity
decreased from the 1982-87 period to the 1994-96 period, and was smallest in the 1991-93
period. Overall, this is consistent with the bond market deregulation process that gradually
evolved over the 1980s; these ﬁrms had the most to gain from deregulation, and their cash
ﬂow sensitivity falls accordingly. Although sensitivity does appear larger in the 1990s for U
ﬁrms, the increase relative to the 1980s is small.
The important thing to note here is that the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients on cash ﬂow
between U and R ﬁrms remained signiﬁcant in the 1990s, even though the bond eligibility
criteria were lifted in 1990. This is consistent with ﬁgures 4 and 5 where it was shown that
the relative reliance on bank debt across ﬁrm groups was preserved over this 16 year period.
4.2 Keiretsu Membership and Bond Eligibility
Why do the bond eligible ﬁrms display higher sensitivity? If bank aﬃliated ﬁrms enjoyed
better access to capital, then these ﬁrms should be able to invest closer to their ﬁrst-best level
regardless of bond eligibility. However, if the costs of maintaining the relationship were large,
or, as suggested by Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), if banks forced ﬁrms to over-borrow, ﬁrms
may have willingly left their main banks. This section explores this issue by incorporating
both the bond eligibility and the Keiretsu membership ﬁrm divisions.
Suppose there exists asymmetric information problems in the bond market, and these
costs are similar for all eligible ﬁrms. The presence of such costs creates a role for internal
funding of investment, as well as for banks that assume monitoring roles. If banks are a net
beneﬁt to ﬁrms, then ﬁrms with a main bank should have less need to rely on internal funds,
and thus a lower investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity, than ﬁrms without a main bank. Eﬀective
bank and ﬁrm speciﬁc health measures into the Q equation and shows that the coeﬃcient on bank health
measures became signiﬁcant for small ﬁrms after 1993.
23monitoring (at least beyond monitoring by shareholders or the bond market) implies it is
in the shareholder’s interest for these ﬁrms to maintain their relationships with these banks
even in the presence of outside ﬁnancing options. Thus, cash ﬂow sensitivity should be lower
for GR, GS, and GU ﬁrms than for the corresponding IR, IS, and IU ﬁrms.
If, however, main banks push loans and extract rents in the process, then cash ﬂow
sensitivity should again be lower for GR ﬁrms than for IR ﬁrms, both of which are restricted
from the bond market. Both sets of ﬁrms are bank-dependent, but only those with a main
bank (GR ﬁrms) are pressured. These ﬁrms may enjoy better access to capital, but possibly
only with large indirect costs. Thus, whether ﬁrms beneﬁt from close bank ties or not is
empirically indistinguishable based on results for IR and GR ﬁrms alone.
However, the implications are diﬀerent for those ﬁrms with outside ﬁnancing options,
since these ﬁrms are in a better bargaining position to counter bank pressure. Eligible ﬁrms
with a main bank may purposely reduce loan dependence in favor of bond ﬁnancing, and
turn to internal sources for marginal investment sooner than would an eligible ﬁrm without
a main bank. This would occur if the costs of internal ﬁnance (including the costs incurred
because of the unpredictability of internal ﬁnance) are lower than the rents extracted by the
main bank when loans are extended. IU ﬁrms should have lower sensitivity than GU ﬁrms
since IU ﬁrms do not have a main bank relationship, and therefore have less of a need to turn
to internal ﬁnancing once funding from the bond market is exhausted. This test gets at the
heart of the original HKS91 and Hoshi et al. (1990b) studies because it attempts to identify
not only bank-dependent ﬁrms, but do so after controlling for outside ﬁnancing options.
4.3 Proﬁtability and Bank-Aﬃliation
The following sample statistics shed considerable light on which of the above hypotheses
more accurately describes the nature of main bank relationships. Figure 6 shows the mean
total assets for GR, GU, IR, and IU ﬁrms (GS and IS ﬁrms are excluded from the ﬁgures for
simplicity). Group ﬁrms, whether bond restricted or not, are larger than their corresponding
independent ﬁrms, and the ﬁgures are net of yearly industry means to control for composition
eﬀects.
Figures 7, 8, and 9 track the earnings per share, proﬁt, and “eﬃciency” rates of these
ﬁrm groups (net of industry means). Figure 7 shows that earnings per share of GU ﬁrms was
consistently lower than that of IU ﬁrms throughout the 1980s, and the diﬀerence increased
24during the asset appreciation period. During the the early 1980’s, the earnings per share of
both restricted groups, GR and IR ﬁrms, was similar. However, after the relaxation of the
bond criteria in 1987, earnings per share rose for independent ﬁrms, but remained ﬂat for
group ﬁrms.
Figure 8 presents mean before tax proﬁts normalized by total assets (net of industry
means). Until 1990, group ﬁrms (GR and GU ﬁrms), although larger, were less proﬁtable
than their corresponding independent ﬁrm groups (IR and IU ﬁrms). This is consistent
with the ﬁndings of Nakatani (1984) for the 1960’s and 1970’s, and Weinstein and Yafeh
(1995, 1998) for the 1980s. After 1990, however, the diﬀerences disappear. Furthermore, the
gap in proﬁtability between the restricted (IR, GR) and unrestricted (IU, GU) ﬁrm groups
narrowed considerably due to the rise in proﬁtability for the former groups following the
loosening of the bond eligibility criteria in 1987.
Most dramatic is the diﬀerences in productive eﬃciency between group and independent
ﬁrms. Figure 9 presents the mean value added normalized by total assets for each group
(net of industry means).38 Group ﬁrms are deﬁnitively less eﬃcient than their corresponding
independent ﬁrms, and, unlike the proﬁtability measures, the diﬀerences do not disappear in
the 1990s. This ﬁgure is consistent with claims Keiretsu member ﬁrms “over-capitalized”.
Table 12 looks at the incidence and size of bond issues of eligible ﬁrms. The ﬁrst two
columns show the percentage of eligible ﬁrms, either independent or group, that actually
issued bonds.39 The last four columns list the mean and median issue sizes (conditional on
positive issue), and show that Keiretsu member ﬁrms had larger issues. What is striking is
that in every year, a higher percentage of group ﬁrms accessed the bond markets with larger
issues, despite their relatively worse performance.
Because this is a crucial point, tables 14 and 13 verify for the current sample that Keiretsu
member ﬁrms were indeed less proﬁtable prior to the lifting of the eligibility criteria, but
tended to access the bond markets more often. In table 13, various proﬁt measures are
38Value added is calculated using the method described in Keiei Bunseki Handbook (1987). The calculation
is fairly involved, but proceeds generally as follows. Starting with gross sales, various portions of the selling
and administrative expenses, cost of goods manufactured, inventory adjustments, and transfer payments
are subtracted oﬀ to get the ﬁnal value. Each of these components is adjusted so that only the non-
labor and non-depreciation components are subtracted oﬀ. The non-labor components of the cost of goods
manufactured includes raw materials, the non-depreciation overhead expenses, and purchases of intermediate
goods. Inventory is adjusted for sales/revaluations of both work in process and ﬁnal goods inventories.
39In this table, all eligible ﬁrm-year observations are used making the total number of ﬁrms diﬀerent for
each year.
25regressed on controls for ﬁnance structure, ﬁrm size, sales trends, capital intensity, corporate
governance, and a Keiretsu membership dummy.40 The top panel shows that in the 1980’s,
Keiretsu membership reduced ﬁrm proﬁts, whether measured by operating proﬁts normalized
by total assets, or simply earnings per share. Other proﬁt measures, or value added, yield
similar results and have been omitted to save space. Two things are important. First,
ownership by ﬁnancial institutions is negative and generally signiﬁcant above and beyond
bank aﬃliation captured by the Keiretsu dummy. Second, in the bottom panel which presents
the same regressions for the 1990s after the lifting of the issuing criteria, Keiretsu membership
is generally insigniﬁcant.
Table 14 presents probit regressions where a dummy for actual bond issues is regressed
on ﬁrm size, proﬁtability, previous bond activity, dummies for eligibility group and Keiretsu
membership, and corporate governance controls. Despite their lower proﬁtability, member-
ship in a Keiretsu increased the probability of a bond issue in the 1980s, but had no eﬀect
in the 1990s. The inclusion of other combinations of regressors that control for proﬁtability,
ﬁnance structure, and ﬁrm size all have the expected sign, but the sign and signiﬁcance of
the Keiretsu dummy is unaﬀected in for both the 1980s or 1990s.
Taken together, these results are quite revealing. First, the eﬀects of Keiretsu mem-
bership on proﬁtability and bond activity present in the 1980s disappeared in the 1990s.
For the 1980s, why would ﬁrms that had a main bank need the bond market more often
than independent ﬁrms? Potentially, this could be explained by diﬀerences in performance,
as more proﬁtable ﬁrms should be able to access the bond market with a lower premium.
However, the very ﬁrms that issued the most often in the 1980s, and with the largest issues,
were relatively less proﬁtable.
It is possible that ﬁrms connected to main banks enjoyed the bank support when issuing
bonds.41 There is evidence that banks acted as “custodians” during the 1980s for their client
ﬁrms (however, banks were legally prevented from moving into the underwriting business
until 1993). That said, it is still unclear as to why playing this role was in the bank’s interest
given that they directly competed with the bond market. Why would banks willingly back
their clients that wanted to issue bonds?42 Much more plausible is the idea that bank-
40Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) used a similar analysis for the 1977-86 period. All regressions in tables 13
and 14 include unreported constant terms, and industry and year dummies.
41Diamond (1991), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)
42Hall and Weinstein (2000) ﬁnd no evidence that independent ﬁrms faced an interest premium on bond
issues, even though they did not have the backing of a main bank.
26aﬃliated ﬁrms, although less proﬁtable, found the costs of bond ﬁnancing less than the costs
associated with maintaining their traditional bank ties. Once deregulation gave these ﬁrms
access to alternative ﬁnancing sources, they exercised their new bargaining power over their
banks. This left banks little choice but to back their clients’ bond issues, or risk loosing
them as clients altogether.
4.4 Cash Flow Sensitivity-Keiretsu Division
This section presents evidence on cash ﬂow sensitivity for Keiretsu and independent ﬁrms
after controlling for external credit opportunities. As a starting point, table 15 presents the
simple division based on group membership alone. First, Q was larger and more signiﬁcant for
group ﬁrms in the ﬁxed-eﬀects regression. However, when decomposed into its fundamental
and non-fundamental parts in the GMM regression, only the non-fundamental part remained
signiﬁcant for group ﬁrms, while only the fundamental part was signiﬁcant for independent
ﬁrms. This suggests that investment of group ﬁrms was less tied to fundamentals during the
asset appreciation period. Second, the diﬀerence in cash ﬂow sensitivity between group and
independent ﬁrms was statistically insigniﬁcant. All robustness checks described above yield
similar results.
Table 16 repeats the above regressions after crossing the bond eligibility division with
membership in a Keiretsu. As above, Q was more signiﬁcant for group ﬁrms in the ﬁxed-
eﬀects regression, but considerably larger and more signiﬁcant for independent ﬁrms when
decomposed, which again suggests that investment of bank-aﬃliated ﬁrms was relatively
loosely tied to fundamentals. Cash ﬂow sensitivity was smallest for GR ﬁrms, and the
diﬀerence over IR ﬁrms was everywhere signiﬁcant. The story is reversed, however, for bond
eligible ﬁrms. Sensitivity was largest for GU ﬁrms, and the diﬀerence over the IU coeﬃcient
is statistically signiﬁcant. Eligibility implied higher sensitivity for both independent and
group ﬁrms (consistent with the results of the last section), but the within-group diﬀerence
was much larger for group ﬁrms. That is , Keiretsu member ﬁrms displayed a much larger
spread in sensitivity. Mature and healthy ﬁrms with strong bank ties and bond market access
relied on internal funds more than independent ﬁrms.
As a robustness check, in table 17 cash ﬂow is separated into negative and positive
observations, and a separate coeﬃcient is estimated for each. The same pattern emerged,
and the diﬀerences in the IR/GR groups and the GU/IU groups were again statistically
27signiﬁcant (with the exception of the GR/IR diﬀerence in the GMM regression). These
same sets of regressions were repeated using the robustness checks described in section 4,
and have been omitted to save space.
One point that needs to be revisited is the potential criticism that cash ﬂow sensitivity
merely proxys for proﬁt opportunities not captured by Q. This issue was raised in section 4 in
light of the ﬁnding that U ﬁrms, which had relatively high proﬁt rates, displayed the highest
investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity. Here, eligible group ﬁrms (GU ﬁrms) had consistently lower
proﬁt rates than did the corresponding independent ﬁrms, yet had higher cash ﬂow sensitivity
than independent eligible ﬁrms (IU ﬁrms). This is a reversal of the supposed direction of
this speciﬁcation error, and makes it diﬃcult to conclude that the “proxying” eﬀect drove
the results of section 4.
In table 18 a separate coeﬃcient is estimated for each of the four time periods. Since
the bond eligibility criteria were lifted in 1990, presumably all ﬁrms faced similar ﬁnancing
options after this date. This would suggest that the diﬀerences in cash ﬂow sensitivity
between IR/GR ﬁrms and GU/IU ﬁrms present in the 1980s should be smaller in the 1990s.
The coeﬃcients on cash ﬂow were everywhere smallest for GR ﬁrms (and only marginally
signiﬁcant using GMM), while those for IR ﬁrms are larger and signiﬁcant. For all ﬁrm
groups, sensitivity seems to have decreased from the 1982-87 period to the 1994-96 period.
However, in all cases the same pattern emerges. GU ﬁrms again displayed the highest
sensitivity whereas GR ﬁrms had the lowest. Note, however, that the diﬀerence in sensitivity
between IR/GR ﬁrms and GU/IU ﬁrms was generally signiﬁcant in the 1980s (particularly
in the 1982-87 period before the ﬁrst relaxation of the bond criteria), but not in the 1990s.
As shown in ﬁgure 8, and in tables 13 and 14, the diﬀerence in proﬁt rates between group
and independent ﬁrms that was present in the 1980s disappeared in the 1990s.
Finally, ﬁgures 10 and 11 present the coeﬃcients on CF1 in yearly cross sectional OLS
regressions of investment on PRAT, price adjusted Q and Q squared, a dummy for bond
issues, cash ﬂow deﬁned as CF1, and a full set of industry dummies. Because land was
such an important element in the asset appreciation of the 1980s, establishing that the
above pattern is robust to its inclusion and exclusion is vital. In ﬁgure 10, the dependent
variable, I/K, excludes land and the numerator of Q is adjusted to reﬂect this (as in previous
regressions). In the bottom panel, I/K includes the investment and the stock of land (market
value). In both ﬁgures, the sensitivity coeﬃcient is largest for group unrestricted ﬁrms in
28the 1980s and smallest for group unrestricted. However, after 1987 when the eligibility
criteria were relaxed, the diﬀerences across the four groups disappear.43 Note that the
spread in sensitivity in the 1980s when land is included appears larger than when excluded,
particularly in the early years. This contrasts with the results from table 11 where it was
shown that the diﬀerence across the bond eligibility groups remained signiﬁcant in the 1990s.
The results of this section show that those ﬁrms that were known to face ﬁnancing
constraints in the bond market again displayed lower sensitivity. However, this eﬀect was
exacerbated if the ﬁrm was also a member of a Keiretsu group. Rather than conclude that
ﬁrms enjoyed a net beneﬁt from relationship banking, I oﬀer this as evidence in support of
the predatory view, since sensitivity was highest for eligible, bank-aﬃliated ﬁrms.
5 Conclusion
If close bank ties are costly for mature and healthy ﬁrms, should we still expect banks to
facilitate lower cash ﬂow sensitivity? This study presents evidence on this issue for a sample
of Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms over the last 20 years. Using the bond issuing criteria that
were in place in the 1980s as a ﬁrm sorting criteria, I ﬁrst demonstrate that investment-cash
ﬂow sensitivity was smallest for ﬁrms that were restricted from issuing bonds. This result
is robust to several econometric speciﬁcations, measures of cash ﬂow, and corrections for
negative cash ﬂow observations.
On the face of it, this ﬁnding is at odds with standard predictions in the cash ﬂow
literature; given that bond-eligible ﬁrms should face lower ﬁnancing constraints, these ﬁrms
should also display the lowest cash ﬂow sensitivity. Finding the opposite suggests either cash
ﬂow sensitivity analysis is inappropriate because the monotonicity hypothesis as formulated
by FHP88 and KZ97 is not satisﬁed, or other ﬁrm characteristics not controlled for in the
standard investment-cash ﬂow equation drive the results.
Large banks have historically been at the center of the Japanese ﬁnancial system, precisely
because of the legal restrictions on alternative ﬁnancing sources. Many have argued that
long-term banking ties, or “main banking” in the case of Japan, allows debt holders access
to inside information about the investment opportunities facing the ﬁrm. This eﬀectively
43The pattern shown in these ﬁgures is surprisingly robust. The inclusion/exclusion of Q, the addition of
bank debt/TL and outstanding bonds/TL and their squares, and the inclusion of various corporate gover-
nance measures used in the proﬁtability and probit regressions, ﬁrm size, and other proﬁtability measures
did not substantially change the results.
29allows client ﬁrms to stay on their ﬁrst best investment path even when internal funds are
insuﬃcient. Recent research, however, has uncovered a dark side to Japanese relationship
banking practices. Consistent with this, the results presented here suggest that banks did
provide relatively easy access to ﬁnancing (as evidenced by low sensitivity measures for bank
dependent ﬁrms), but may have extracted rents in the process. This prompted bond-eligible
ﬁrms to shift toward alternative ﬁnancing sources at the earliest opportunity.
30Table 1: Example Bond Issue Criteria
Table presents minimum approval criteria for domestic issuance of secured convertible bonds and secured
strait bonds for selected years. Criteria are taken from Kaneko and Battaglini (1990) and Karp and Koike
(1990). A ﬁrm wishing to issue bonds in period t must have met the below criteria in period t − 1.
October 1976-July 1987 Criteria for Domestic Secured Convertible Bonds
Performance Standards Issuer’s Book Equity
3-6 Billion Yen 6-10 Billion Yen > 10 Billion Yen
Book Equity/Paid in Capital NA 1.50 1.20
Book Equity/Total Assets NA 0.2 0.15
Operational Proﬁt/Total Assets NA 0.05 0.04
Earnings per share (yen) NA 7.00 7.00
Dividends per share (yen) NA 5.00 5.00
Approval Criteria NA EPS, DPS EPS, DPS
NA and at least and at least
NA two of other two of other
NA three criteria three criteria
July 1987-May 1989 Criteria for Domestic Secured Convertible Bonds
Performance Standards Issuer’s Book Equity
3-6 Billion Yen 6-10 Billion Yen > 10 Billion Yen
Book Equity/Paid in Capital 2.00 1.50 1.20
Book Equity/Total Assets 0.15 0.12 0.10
Operational Proﬁt/Total Assets 0.07 0.06 0.05
Earnings per share (yen) 7.00 7.00 7.00
Dividends per share (yen) 5.00 5.00 5.00
Approval Criteria EPS, DPS EPS, DPS EPS, DPS
and at least and at least and at least
two of other two of other two of other
three criteria three criteria three criteria
July 1987-May 1989 Criteria for Domestic Secured Strait Bonds
Performance Standards Issuer’s Book Equity
3-6 Billion Yen 6-10 Billion Yen > 10 Billion Yen
Book Equity/Paid in Capital 3.00 1.50 1.20
Book Equity/Total Assets 0.30 0.12 0.10
Operational Proﬁt/Total Assets 0.08 0.06 0.05
Interest Coverage 3.00 1.20 1.00
Dividends per share (yen) at least 5 yen at least 4 yen at least 3 yen
per share for per share for per share for
past 3 years past 3 years or 5 past 3 years or 4
yen previous year yen previous year
Approval Criteria If ﬁrm has no bonds outstanding, then DPS
and at least 3 of other 4 criteria satisﬁed.
If ﬁrm has outstanding bonds: (a) if DPS met in
last 3 years then only 1 remaining criteria
satisﬁed; (b) if DPS met in previous year,
then 2 of remaining 4 criteria satisﬁed.
31Table 2: Why Did Firms Fail the Bond Criteria?
The bond issuing criteria are broken into four categories, SIZE, EPS, CAPITAL RATIOS,
and DPS. The ﬁrst column lists the number of ﬁrms that failed the size requirement. The second
column list the number of ﬁrms that failed the EPS requirement given passage of the SIZE
requirement. The third column lists the number of ﬁrms that failed the CAPITAL RATIOS
requirements given passage of the requirements in columns two and three. Column ﬁve lists the
number of ﬁrms that failed the DPS requirement given passage of all other requirements.
FY SIZE EPS CAP. RAT. DPS Total Failures
80 221 26 4 9 260
81 204 27 8 4 243
82 184 39 5 5 233
83 178 55 5 4 242
84 172 55 4 2 236
85 159 43 5 5 212
86 145 52 7 7 211
87 138 31 6 8 183
88 68 75 7 10 160
89 59 27 9 14 109
Table 3: Bond Issue Criteria and Actual Bond Issues
Table presents the incidence of bond issues (convertible, strait, and warrant) by year and ﬁrm group. Firm groups are determined using
the minimum approval criteria for domestic issuance of secured convertible bonds and secured strait bonds taken from Kaneko and
Battaglini (1990) and Karp and Koike (1990). A ﬁrm wishing to issue bonds in period t must have met these criteria in period t − 1.
R ﬁrms were eligible at most one period between 1980-90, S ﬁrms were eligible 2 ∼ 4 periods, and U ﬁrms were eligible 5 or more periods.
Restricted Firms Semi-Res. Firms Unrestricted Firms
FY No Issue Issue Total No Issue Issue Total No Issue Issue Total
80 112 4 116 100 5 105 190 35 225
81 107 9 116 91 14 105 166 59 225
82 109 7 116 94 11 105 173 52 225
83 108 8 116 97 8 105 159 66 225
84 112 4 116 92 13 105 144 81 225
85 111 5 116 89 16 105 145 80 225
86 108 8 116 80 25 105 133 92 225
87 112 4 116 82 23 105 140 85 225
88 111 5 116 69 36 105 129 96 225
89 99 17 116 72 33 105 128 97 225
90 85 31 116 78 27 105 170 55 225
91 90 26 116 63 42 105 137 88 225
92 101 15 116 86 19 105 178 47 225
93 104 12 116 92 13 105 180 45 225
94 106 10 116 92 13 105 191 34 225
95 105 11 116 90 15 105 188 37 225
96 102 14 116 89 16 105 165 60 225
Obs. 1,782 190 1,972 1,456 329 1,785 2,716 1,109 3,825
32Table 4: Sample Statistics for Bond Eligibility Division
Table presents statistics on a sample of 446 manufacturing ﬁrms split by the number of
times the ﬁrm was eligible to issue bonds from 1980-1990. Firms eligible at most one
time are restricted (R Firms), ﬁrms eligible 2 ∼ 4 times are semi-restricted (S Firms),
and ﬁrms eligible 5 or more times are unrestricted (U Firms). There are 116 R Firms,
105 S Firms, and 225 U Firms.
I/K 1980-87 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96
R Firms Mean 0.089 0.133 0.130 0.074
Median 0.071 0.103 0.102 0.062
Std. Dev. 0.084 0.113 0.110 0.079
S Firms Mean 0.117 0.151 0.127 0.086
Median 0.097 0.125 0.101 0.068
Std. Dev. 0.097 0.120 0.104 0.094
U Firms Mean 0.144 0.176 0.138 0.087
Median 0.124 0.155 0.117 0.072
Std. Dev. 0.099 0.103 0.098 0.068
Q 1980-87 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96
R Firms Mean 0.701 4.096 1.841 0.560
Median 0.494 3.121 1.120 0.480
Std. Dev. 2.248 4.465 3.596 2.822
S Firms Mean 1.284 4.147 1.651 0.768
Median 0.631 3.284 1.146 0.570
Std. Dev. 2.891 4.017 3.175 2.318
U Firms Mean 2.017 4.249 1.361 0.532
Median 1.123 3.218 0.841 0.525
Std. Dev. 3.405 4.945 3.709 2.724
Cash Flow/K 1980-87 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96
R Firms Mean 0.161 0.268 0.184 0.151
Median 0.154 0.249 0.181 0.165
Std. Dev. 0.150 0.161 0.160 0.169
S Firms Mean 0.238 0.296 0.217 0.187
Median 0.215 0.274 0.195 0.188
Std. Dev. 0.140 0.207 0.259 0.134
U Firms Mean 0.331 0.380 0.240 0.227
Median 0.299 0.342 0.233 0.225
Std. Dev. 0.171 0.187 0.163 0.186
Op. Prof/K 1980-87 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96
R Firms Mean 0.171 0.300 0.194 0.089
Median 0.152 0.256 0.138 0.086
Std. Dev. 0.219 0.246 0.254 0.218
S Firms Mean 0.288 0.318 0.205 0.145
Median 0.242 0.276 0.144 0.110
Std. Dev. 0.247 0.311 0.379 0.209
U Firms Mean 0.400 0.395 0.194 0.204
Median 0.311 0.311 0.146 0.160
Std. Dev. 0.321 0.352 0.252 0.223
33Table 5: Sample Statistics for Bond Eligibility Division
Table presents statistics on a sample of 446 manufacturing ﬁrms split by the number of times the
ﬁrm was eligible to issue bonds from 1980-1990. Firms eligible at most one time are restricted (R
Firms), ﬁrms eligible 2 ∼ 4 times are semi-restricted (S Firms), and ﬁrms eligible 5 or more times
are unrestricted (U Firms). There are 116 R Firms, 105 S Firms, and 225 U Firms.
Real Sales (in Y10,000) 1980-87 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96
R Firms Mean 5310 5994 6544 6411
Median 1483 1882 2012 1947
Std. Dev. 13555 14559 15820 16084
S Firms Mean 8992 9792 10316 10167
Median 2328 3125 3359 3233
Std. Dev. 27900 27366 27801 26842
U Firms Mean 15098 21496 24151 25996
Median 6320 9586 10892 10850
Std. Dev. 30385 42493 48159 55141
Sales Growth 1980-87 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96
R Firms Mean 0.028 0.078 -0.011 0.005
Median 0.024 0.064 -0.013 0.002
Std. Dev. 0.125 0.117 0.097 0.089
S Firms Mean 0.053 0.075 -0.002 0.020
Median 0.050 0.061 -0.002 0.015
Std. Dev. 0.120 0.097 0.094 0.087
U Firms Mean 0.072 0.080 -0.003 0.033
Median 0.062 0.066 0.000 0.024
Std. Dev. 0.102 0.082 0.084 0.082
Total Assets (in Y10,000) 1980-87 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96
R Firms Mean 7071 7465 8420 7964
Median 1376 1760 1909 1885
Std. Dev. 22420 21970 24830 22908
S Firms Mean 13504 14391 15556 14761
Median 1978 2962 3328 3319
Std. Dev. 48389 44874 47133 44123
U Firms Mean 15733 24232 27437 28018
Median 5837 10158 11234 11642
Std. Dev. 35128 49227 55156 55824
Bank Debt/Tot. Lia. 1980-87 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96
R Firms Mean 0.441 0.389 0.389 0.417
Median 0.447 0.381 0.387 0.432
Std. Dev. 0.175 0.176 0.181 0.189
S Firms Mean 0.378 0.298 0.300 0.313
Median 0.402 0.297 0.292 0.307
Std. Dev. 0.174 0.175 0.182 0.196
U Firms Mean 0.214 0.148 0.189 0.200
Median 0.176 0.102 0.153 0.151
Std. Dev. 0.181 0.149 0.171 0.185
34Table 6: Cash Flow Sensitivity, Pooled Sample, 1980-90
Table presents results on the standard cash ﬂow equation using OLS, ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, and
Arellano-Bond GMM estimation. The dependent variable is I/K. CONST is the target investment
rate, Q is the coeﬃcient on Tobin’s Q and is the inverse of the adjustment cost parameter, Qnf
is the coeﬃcient on the non-fundamental portion of Q, LAGIK is the coeﬃcient on lagged I/K,
PRAT is the coeﬃcient on the price ratio, and CF is the coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow. Industry and
time dummies are included in the OLS regression, and time dummies in the ﬁxed-eﬀects and GMM
regressions. The t statistics (OLS, FE) and z statistics (GMM) are in parentheses, and are calculated
with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (for OLS and GMM). The superscripts a, b, and c
denote signiﬁcance at the .01, .05, and .1 levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. The p − values of the
Sargan and the M test (for second order serial correlation) are presented for the GMM regression.
The sample period is 1980-90.
Parameters OLS Fixed Eﬀects First Diﬀerenced GMM








PRAT -.0236 -.0458 -.0807
(−1.79)c (−3.11)a (−1.90)c




R2 All .207 .188
Sargan Test .02
M Test .91
Parameters OLS Fixed Eﬀects First Diﬀerenced GMM








PRAT -.0232 -.0452 -.0786
(−1.77)c (−3.1)a (−1.91)c
CF .1638 .1593 .2591
(9.27)a (12.83)a (4.31)a




R2 All .214 .197
Sargan Test .03
M Test .81
35Table 7: CF Sensitivity, Bond Elig. Division, 1980-90
Table presents results on the standard cash ﬂow equation using OLS, ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, and Arellano-Bond GMM
estimation. The dependent variable is I/K. CONST is the target investment rate, Q is the coeﬃcient on Tobin’s
Q and is the inverse of the adjustment cost parameter, Qnf is the coeﬃcient on the non-fundamental portion of Q,
LAGIK is the coeﬃcient on lagged I/K, PRAT is the coeﬃcient on the price ratio, and CF is the coeﬃcient on
cash ﬂow. Industry and time dummies are included in the OLS regression, and time dummies in the ﬁxed-eﬀects and
GMM regressions. The t statistics (OLS, FE) and z statistics (GMM) are in parentheses, and are calculated with
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (for OLS and GMM). The superscripts a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance
at the .01, .05, and .1 levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. The p − values of the Sargan and the M test (for second
order serial correlation) are presented for the GMM regression. The sample period is 1980-90.
OLS
Parameters All Firms R Firms S Firms U Firms U-R Diﬀerence
CONST .089 .1227 .1178 .0673
(3.49)a (2.74)a (1.91)c (1.93)c
Q .0001 -.0002 .0016 -.0007
(.168) (−.334) (1.74)c (−1.36)
PRAT -.0236 -.0353 -.0384 -.0127
(−1.79)c (−1.53) (−1.24) (−.68)
CF .2143 .1345 .1775 .236 .1015
(14.46)a (5.5)a (3.7)a (14.05)a (3.42)a
R2 .207 .15 .175 .219
Fixed Eﬀects
Parameters All Firms R Firms S Firms U Firms U-R Diﬀerence
CONST .1255 .1473 .1882 .0418
(5.63)a (3.08)a (4.05)a (1.41)
Q .002 .0005 .0029 .0011
(5.2)a (.55) (3.08)a (2.18)b
PRAT -.0458 -.0546 -.0823 -.0186
(−3.11)a (−1.74)c (−2.64)a (−.963)
CF .2113 .1047 .1345 .3723 .2676
(19.42)a (5.91)a (6.11)a (21.18)a (10.72)a
R2 Within .146 .106 .112 .24
R2 Between .334 .144 .23 .231
R2 All .188 .113 .137 .193
First Diﬀerenced GMM
Parameters All Firms R Firms S Firms U Firms U-R Diﬀerence
LAGIK .0358 .0571 -.0305 .0425
(1.37) (1.02) (−.5) (1.54)
Q .0055 .0073 .0089 .0074
(2.49)b (2.35)b (1.78)c (3.19)a
Qnf .0005 -.0008 -.0019 .001
(.30) (−.39) (−.8) (.62)
CF .3701 .1749 .2478 .4035 .2286
(7.77)a (3.31)a (2.37)b (6.01)a (2.68)a
PRAT -.0807 -.0501 -.1498 -.0557
(−1.9)c (−.57) (−2.15)b (−1.04)
Sargan Test .02 .991 .999 .471
M Test .91 .531 .963 .496
36Table 8: CF Interacted with Bond Issue, Bond Elig. Division, 1980-90
Table presents results on the standard cash ﬂow equation using OLS, ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, and Arellano-Bond
GMM estimation. The dependent variable is I/K. CONST is the target investment rate, Q is the
coeﬃcient on Tobin’s Q and is the inverse of the adjustment cost parameter, Qnf is the coeﬃcient on
the non-fundamental portion of Q, LAGIK is the coeﬃcient on lagged I/K, PRAT is the coeﬃcient on
the price ratio, CF is the coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow, and CFxBOND is the coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow crossed
with a dummy for bond issues. Industry and time dummies are included in the OLS regression, and time
dummies in the ﬁxed-eﬀects and GMM regressions. The t statistics (OLS, FE) and z statistics (GMM) are
in parentheses, and are calculated with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (for OLS and GMM).
The superscripts a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance at the .01, .05, and .1 levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. The
p − values of the Sargan and the M test (for second order serial correlation) are presented for the GMM
regression. The sample period is 1980-90.
OLS
Parameters All Firms R Firms S Firms U Firms U-R Diﬀerence
CONST .0943 .1259 .1285 .071
(3.74)a (2.81)a (2.09)b (2.05)b
Q .0001 0 .0015 -.0006
(.31) (−.039) (1.69)c (−1.16)
PRAT -.024 -.0374 -.0417 -.0122
(−1.84)c (−1.62) (−1.35) (−.68)
CF .1961 .1316 .1691 .2202 .0886
(13.15)a (5.37)a (3.62)a (12.39)a (2.93)a
CFxBOND .0891 .1462 .12 .071
(6.88)a (2.33)b (3.11)a (4.88)a
R2 .222 .157 .189 .233
Fixed Eﬀects
Parameters All Firms R Firms S Firms U Firms U-R Diﬀerence
CONST .1268 .1424 .1865 .0459
(5.71)a (2.99)a (4.05)a (1.55)
Q .0019 .0006 .0028 .0011
(4.95)a (.76) (2.98)a (2.13)b
PRAT -.0455 -.0514 -.0797 -.0193
(−3.11)a (−1.64)c (−2.58)a (−1)
CF .1999 .0999 .1229 .3596 .2597
(18.22)a (5.64)a (5.6)a (19.92)a (10.27)a
CFxBOND .066 .1541 .12 .0327
(6.6)a (3.07)a (4.45)a (2.99)a
R2 Within .154 .114 .129 .243
R2 Between .365 .161 .227 .245
R2 All .202 .122 .149 .202
First Diﬀerenced GMM
Parameters All Firms R Firms S Firms U Firms U-R Diﬀerence
LAGIK .0338 .0559 -.0471 .0406
(1.3) (.99) (−.79) (1.49)
Q .0056 .0082 .0086 .0076
(2.5)b (2.46)b (1.78)c (3.19)a
Qnf .0005 -.0008 -.0019 .001
(.33) (−.39) (−.8) (.6)
CF .3722 .157 .2347 .4054 .2484
(7.87)a (3.06)a (2.27)b (6.72)a (3.14)a
CFxBOND -.0054 .3272 .0843 -.0058
(−.1) (2.56)b (1.08) (−.11)
PRAT -.0823 -.0149 -.1506 -.0578
(−1.94)c (−.16) (−2.24)b (−1.1)
Sargan Test .03 .89 .75 .499
M Test .888 .598 .828 .502
37Table 9: Negative Cash Flow Observations, Bond Elig. Division
Table presents the number of negative cash ﬂow observations by ﬁrm
group. Cash Flow (CF1) is deﬁned as after tax earnings minus dividends
paid plus accounting depreciation.
Fiscal Year R Firms S Firms U Firms Total
80 4 0 0 4
81 7 4 0 11
82 10 2 1 13
83 10 1 0 11
84 9 2 1 12
85 11 0 0 11
86 19 2 0 21
87 4 1 0 5
88 3 1 0 4
89 0 0 0 0
90 5 2 2 9
91 3 4 5 12
92 9 12 13 34
93 12 4 14 30
94 14 6 11 31
95 15 7 12 34
96 12 4 7 23
Total 147 52 66 265
38Table 10: Negative CF Observations and Bond Elig. Division, 1980-90
Table presents results on the standard cash ﬂow equation using OLS, ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, and Arellano-Bond
GMM estimation. The dependent variable is I/K. CONST is the target investment rate, Q is the
coeﬃcient on Tobin’s Q and is the inverse of the adjustment cost parameter, Qnf is the coeﬃcient on the
non-fundamental portion of Q, LAGIK is the coeﬃcient on lagged I/K, PRAT is the coeﬃcient on the
price ratio, POS CF is the coeﬃcient on positive, and NEG CF is the coeﬃcient on negative cash ﬂow
observations. Industry and time dummies are included in the OLS regression, and time dummies in the
ﬁxed-eﬀects and GMM regressions. The t statistics (OLS, FE) and z statistics (GMM) are in parentheses,
and are calculated with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (for OLS and GMM). The superscripts
a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance at the .01, .05, and .1 levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. The p − values of
the Sargan and the M test (for second order serial correlation) are presented for the GMM regression. The
sample period is 1980-90.
OLS
Parameters All Firms R Firms S Firms U Firms U-R Diﬀerence
CONST .0724 .1044 .0831 .0653
(2.9)a (2.31)b (1.42) (1.9)c
Q -.0002 -.0003 .0011 -.0007
(−.65) (−.51) (1.29) (−1.4)
PRAT -.0178 -.0287 -.0262 -.0118
(−1.37) (−1.25) (−.88) (−.64)
POS CF .2425 .173 .2437 .2379 .0649
(18.5)a (4.94)a (6.25)a (13.98)a (1.67)c
NEG CF -.026 -.02 -.0264 -.0356
(−1.79)c (−.58) (−1.66)c (−.39)
R2 .217 .157 .196 .219
Fixed Eﬀects
Parameters All Firms R Firms S Firms U Firms U-R Diﬀerence
CONST .1008 .1357 .158 .0359
(4.55)a (2.85)a (3.4)a (1.21)
Q .0016 .0004 .0022 .0011
(4.08)a (.51) (2.36)b (2.13)b
PRAT -.0408 -.0541 -.0736 -.0164
(−2.8)a (−1.73)c (−2.38)b (−.85)
POS CF .2763 .1605 .2146 .3805 .22
(22.33)a (7.11)a (7.78)a (21.42)a (7.66)a
NEG CF -.0988 -.093 -.0347 -.277
(−3.17)a (−1.75)c (−.83) (−1.26)
R2 Within .167 .118 .131 .243
R2 Between .334 .145 .277 .229
R2 All .2 .123 .162 .193
First Diﬀerenced GMM
Parameters All Firms R Firms S Firms U Firms U-R Diﬀerence
LAGIK .0342 .0551 -.0322 .0416
(1.35) (1.01) (−.55) (1.51)
Q .007 .0094 .0061 .0075
(3.45)a (3.05)a (1.48) (3.3)a
Qnf .0013 -.0002 -.0028 .0009
(.86) (−.13) (−1.24) (.52)
POS CF .3859 .2001 .3733 .3964 .1963
(7.77)a (3.04)a (4.7)a (6.41)a (2.17)b
NEG CF -.2211 -.1485 .0395 1.4012
(−1.32) (−1.15) (.42) (.8)
PRAT -.0471 -.026 -.1347 -.0585
(−1.11) (−.303) (−1.9)c (−1.11)
Sargan Test .05 .999 .97 .439
M Test .788 .909 .959 .523
39Table 11: CF Sensitivity by Period (Neg. Obs.), Bond Elig. Division, 1980-96
Table presents results on the standard cash ﬂow equation using ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects and Arellano-Bond
GMM estimation. The dependent variable is I/K. CONST is the target investment rate, Q
is the coeﬃcient on Tobin’s Q and is the inverse of the adjustment cost parameter, Qnf is the
coeﬃcient on the non-fundamental portion of Q, LAGIK is the coeﬃcient on lagged I/K, PRAT
is the coeﬃcient on the price ratio, and POS CF is the coeﬃcient on positive, and NEG CF is
the coeﬃcient on negative cash ﬂow (CF1). Time dummies are included in all regressions. The t
statistics (FE) and z statistics (GMM) are in parentheses, and are calculated with heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors for GMM. The superscripts a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance at the .01,
.05, and .1 levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. The p − values of the Sargan and the M test (for
second order serial correlation) are presented for the GMM regression. The sample period is 1980-96.
Fixed Eﬀects
Parameters All Firms R Firms S Firms U Firms U-R Diﬀerence
CONST .1085 .1163 .1399 .0754
(8.3)a (4.1)a (4.9)a (4.39)a
Q .0013 .0003 .0019 .001
(4.08)a (.364) (2.36)b (2.43)b
PRAT -.0491 -.0429 -.0703 -.0379
(−6.16)a (−2.42)b (−4.05)a (−3.7)a
POS CF80−87 .2939 .1751 .2744 .3568 .1817
(25.13)a (6.4)a (9.2)a (22.91)a (5.77)a
POS CF88−90 .2412 .1877 .2072 .2897 .102
(15.63)a (5.4)a (5.42)a (14.24)a (2.53)b
POS CF91−93 .1618 .1184 .0961 .3128 .1944
(9.89)a (2.77)a (3.89)a (11.23)a (3.81)a
POS CF94−96 .1906 .1462 .1355 .2831 .1369
(9.39)a (3.72)a (2.63)a (10.09)a (2.84)a
NEG CF80−87 -.1645 -.0896 -.1386 -.333
(−3.52)a (−1.57) (−1.21) (−1.29)
NEG CF88−90 -.0417 -.0454 -.0379 .0108
(−1.04) (−.31) (−.83) (.029)
NEG CF91−93 -.0081 .0371 .098 -.1688
(−.16) (.42) (.88) (−2.24)b
NEG CF94−96 -.0084 -.0633 .2694 -.0261
(−.29) (−.82) (1.94)c (−.83)
R2 Within .207 .143 .168 .286
R2 Between .268 .12 .152 .2
R2 All .202 .14 .156 .231
First Diﬀerenced GMM
Parameters All Firms R Firms S Firms U Firms U-R Diﬀerence
LAGIK .073 .0561 .063 .0587
(4.15)a (1.59) (1.93)c (2.7)a
Q .0039 .007 .0043 .0034
(3)a (2.33)b (1.91)c (2.18)b
Qnf -.0015 -.001 -.0025 -.0006
(−1.79)c (−.8) (−1.68)c (−.56)
POS CF80−87 .3804 .1926 .4187 .3902 .1976
(9.5)a (2.74)a (6.53)a (8.81)a (2.32)b
POS CF88−90 .3744 .2803 .3277 .3413 .0610
(5.91)a (3.58)a (2.23)b (5.38)a (.61)
POS CF91−93 .3254 .0777 .1502 .412 .3343
(3.89)a (1.03) (1.73)c (5.66)a (3.19)a
POS CF94−96 .3845 .0963 .1986 .4322 .3359
(6.75)a (1.58) (2.56)b (6.12)a (3.61)a
NEG CF80−87 -.2449 -.142 -.0216 7.2093
(−1.04) (−1.06) (−.27) (1.25)
NEG CF88−90 -.0621 .2072 .0346 -1.8103
(−.42) (.62) (.28) (−.66)
NEG CF91−93 -.2262 .1396 .0086 -.4182
(1.9)c (.9) (.06) (−2.24)b
NEG CF94−96 -.0364 -.0337 .107 -.0837
(−.39) (−.31) (.76) (−1.08)
PRAT -.0831 -.0813 -.07 -.0736
(4.5)a (−2.18)b (−2.29)b (−3.31)a
Sargon Test .99 .988 .97 .967
M Test .394 .715 .482 .587
40Table 12: Incidence and Size of Bond Issues by Eligible Firms
The statistics are calculated using all eligible ﬁrms in each year. The ﬁrst two columns list
the share of ﬁrms within each group that have a bond issue (either convertible, warrant,
or strait bonds). Columns 3-6 list the mean and median size (in Y10,000) of each issue by
group, conditional on non-zero issue.
Pct. of Firms Mean Issue Median Issue
FY Ind Group Ind Group Ind Group
80 0.157 0.321 724.5 876.9 490.3 560.6
81 0.325 0.466 823.9 1140.0 400.0 539.5
82 0.225 0.433 1025.9 1275.6 376.1 625.2
83 0.289 0.483 1186.2 1315.7 535.4 838.5
84 0.370 0.511 1276.8 1555.9 590.1 940.6
85 0.322 0.505 1236.6 1727.1 522.0 1023.2
86 0.422 0.545 1434.1 1483.3 616.0 880.8
87 0.310 0.556 1945.0 1475.5 974.4 1000.0
88 0.410 0.512 2450.7 2342.5 1014.8 1305.3
89 0.340 0.549 3963.0 3693.6 1431.7 1715.3
90 0.257 0.370 1194.6 2235.6 505.6 1050.4
41Table 13: Keiretsu Proﬁtability Regressions
Table presents results for OLS regressions. The dependent variables are Opp. Prof./TA, operating proﬁts
over total assets, and EPS, earnings per share. Bonds/TL is outstanding bonds divided by total liabilities,
Tot. Debt/TL is outstanding bonds plus bank debt over total liabilities, Nom. K/Sales is the nominal capital
stock divided by gross sales, ln(Sales) is the natural log of gross sales, SalesGrth is year-on-year growth
in gross sales, Keiretsu is a dummy variable for Keiretsu membership, and Own Fin. Inst., Own. Indiv.,
Own Non Fin., Own. Top Ten is the percent of outstanding shares owned by ﬁnancial institutions, individuals,
and non-ﬁnancial institutions, respectively. Own. Top Ten is cumulative ownership by the top ten shareholders.
A constant term, industry, and time dummies are included in each regression but not reported. The t statistics
are in parentheses, and are calculated with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The superscripts
a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance at the .01, .05, and .1 levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. The sample period is 1980-90.
OLS: 1980-90 Dependent Variables
parameters Opp. Prof./TA EPS
Bonds/TL -.0031 6.3581
(−.73) (1.7)c
Tot. Debt/TL -.0581 -.0597 -45.35 -47.55





ln(Sales) -.0009 -.0016 -.0016 1.6437 1.2712 1.3046
(−1.54) (−2.79)a (−2.9)a (3.53)a (2.82)a (2.91)a
SalesGrth. .1272 .1123 .1134 51.5298 40.0705 41.777
(16.56)a (15.59)a (15.57)a (8.09)a (6.1)a (6.53)a
Keiretsu -.0049 -.0023 -.0024 -7.2082 -5.3256 -5.3856
(−4.48)a (−2.16)b (−2.21)b (−8.72)a (−6.78)a (−6.89)a
Own. Top Ten .0072 -.0029 -.0014 15.3022 6.7252 8.068
(.81) (−.35) (−.17) (2.24)b (.95) (1.15)
Own. Indiv. -.0564 -.0645 -.0649 -3.0519 -9.9059 -9.7731
(−4.83)a (−6.04)a (−6.06)a (−.39) (−1.29) (−1.27)
Own. Fin. Inst. -.0584 -.0501 -.0503 -13.8283 -5.8417 -5.7498
(−5.3)a (−4.92)a (−4.93)a (−2.34)b (−1.13) (−1.11)
Own. Non Fin. -.073 -.0666 -.0673 -16.6126 -11.7136 -12.0825
(−6.27)a (−6.18)a (−6.22)a (−2.75)a (−2.16)b (−2.21)b
Psudo R2 .224 .286 .286 .06 .119 .121
OLS: 1991-96 Dependent Variables
parameters Opp. Prof./TA EPS
Bonds/TL -.0074 -8.9249
(−1.92)c (−1.8)c
Tot. Debt/TL -.0497 -.0427 -66.2198 -62.7434





ln(Sales) .0015 .0012 .0009 1.4001 1.0019 .887
(2.1)b (1.75)c (1.36) (1.9)c (1.34) (1.17)
SalesGrth. .1172 .1097 .1019 98.6679 88.626 84.5285
(11.5)a (11.11)a (10.58)a (5.9)a (5.59)a (5.36)a
Keiretsu -.002 .0005 .0006 -5.7437 -2.4252 -2.3368
(−1.6) (.38) (.53) (−3.46)a (−1.62) (−1.57)
Own. Top Ten .0385 .0269 .0205 17.7555 2.0404 -1.2701
(3.55)a (2.62)a (2.03)b (1.31) (.16) (−.1)
Own. Indiv. -.0712 -.0657 -.0726 -90.5014 -83.4626 -87.4238
(−4.87)a (−4.87)a (−5.48)a (−5.32)a (−5.53)a (−5.8)a
Own. Fin. Inst. -.0764 -.0635 -.0677 -78.4117 -61.0793 -63.8497
(−5.41)a (−4.99)a (−5.38)a (−4.55)a (−4.02)a (−4.2)a
Own. Non Fin. -.0967 -.0843 -.0864 -80.7858 -64.3379 -65.6266
(−7.37)a (−7.18)a (−7.45)a (−4.82)a (−4.28)a (−4.38)a
Psudo R2 .232 .292 .315 .095 .166 .169
42Table 14: Bond Issue Probit Regressions
Table presents results for probit regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy for bond
issues. Semi − Res is a dummy for the Semi-Restricted, and Unrestricted a dummy for the
unrestricted ﬁrm group. ln(Sales) is the natural log of gross sales, Bonds/TL is outstanding
bonds divided by total liabilities, Oper.Prof./PK is operating proﬁts normalized by the
nominal capital stock, and Own Fin. Inst., Own. Indiv., Own Non Fin., Own. Top Ten
is the percent of outstanding shares owned by ﬁnancial institutions, individuals, and
non-ﬁnancial institutions, respectively. Own. Top Ten is cumulative ownership by the
top ten shareholders. A constant term, industry, and time dummies are included in each
regression, but not reported. The z statistics are in parentheses, and are calculated
with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The superscripts a, b, and c denote sig-
niﬁcance at the .01, .05, and .1 levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. The sample period is 1980-90.
Probit Regression: Bond Issue Dummy
Parameters 1980-90 1991-96
Semi − Res .2589 .2608 -.1018 -.0913
(3.34)a (3.30)a (−1.04) (−0.92)
Unrestricted -.0026 -.0235 -.5698 -.557
(−0.03) (−0.30) (−5.34)a (−5.09)a
Keiretsu .2954 .2517 .089 .082
(5.65)a (4.68)a (1.31) (1.20)
ln(Sales) .3391 .2662 .2943 .309
(15.57)a (9.87)a (10.23)a (8.72)a
Bonds/TL 5.589 5.484 3.796 3.826
(21.07)a (20.36)a (17.50)a (17.08)a
Oper.Prof./PK .4279 .444 .4877 .578
(5.18)a (5.28)a (3.70)a (4.22)a
Own. Fin. Inst. .0919 1.124
(0.22) (1.58)
Own. Indiv. -.893 1.76
(−2.19)b (2.47)b
Own. Non Fin. .658 1.31
(1.70)c (1.86)c
Own. Top Ten -1.868 -.962
(−5.17)a (−1.69)c
Psudo R2 .333 .338 .265 .272
43Table 15: CF Sensitivity, Keiretsu Division, 1980s
Table presents results on the standard cash ﬂow equation using OLS, ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, and
Arellano-Bond GMM estimation. The dependent variable is I/K. CONST is the target
investment rate, Q is the coeﬃcient on Tobin’s Q and is the inverse of the adjustment cost
parameter, Qnf is the coeﬃcient on the non-fundamental portion of Q, LAGIK is the coeﬃ-
cient on lagged I/K, PRAT is the coeﬃcient on the price ratio, and CF is the coeﬃcient on
cash ﬂow. Industry and time dummies are included in the OLS regression, and time dummies
in the ﬁxed-eﬀects and GMM regressions. The t statistics (OLS, FE) and z statistics (GMM)
are in parentheses, and are calculated with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
(for OLS and GMM). The superscripts a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance at the .01, .05, and .1
levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. The p − values of the Sargan and the M test (for second
order serial correlation) are presented for the GMM regression. The sample period is 1980-90.
OLS


















CF .2162 .2031 .013
(15.01)a (12.06)a (.593)
R2 Within .135 .173
R2 Between .316 .334
R2 All .175 .207
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Sargon Test .098 .369
M Test .882 .889
44Table 16: CF Sensitivity, Keiretsu X Bond Elig. Division, 1980s
Table presents results on the standard cash ﬂow equation using OLS, ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, and Arellano-Bond GMM estimation. The dependent
variable is I/K. CONST is the target investment rate, Q is the coeﬃcient on Q and is the inverse of the adjustment cost parameter, Qnf is the
coeﬃcient on the non-fundamental portion of Q, LAGIK is the coeﬃcient on lagged I/K, PRAT is the coeﬃcient on the price ratio, and CF
is the coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow. Industry and time dummies are included in the OLS regression, and time dummies in the ﬁxed-eﬀects and GMM
regressions. The t statistics (OLS, FE) and z statistics (GMM) are in parentheses, and are calculated with heteroskedasticity consistent standard
errors (for OLS and GMM). The superscripts a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance at the .01, .05, and .1 levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. The
p−values of the Sargan and the M test (for second order serial correlation) are presented for the GMM regression. The sample period is 1980-90.
OLS Independent Bank Group Diﬀerence
Parameters Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted IR-GR IU-GU
CONST .0525 .2197 .0693 .1184 .0131 .0685
(.86) (2.36)b (1.35) (1.83)c (.17) (1.45)
Q -.0004 .001 -.0008 -.0002 .0034 -.0006
(−.48) (.88) (−1.41) (−.15) (2.17)b (−.66)
PRAT .0024 -.0942 -.0048 -.0384 .0102 -.0312
(.08) (−1.95)c (−.18) (−1.08) (.26) (−1.26)
CF .1781 .1704 .211 .0932 .1892 .31 .0849 -.099
(4.82)a (2.74)a (10.51)a (2.83)a (3.24)a (11.19)a (1.72)c (−2.89)a
R2 .185 .184 .19 .171 .202 .297
Fixed Eﬀects Independent Bank Group Diﬀerence
Parameters Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted IR-GR IU-GU
CONST .122 .2709 .0488 .1552 .0751 .0203
(1.68)c (4.05)a (1.08) (2.51)b (1.17) (.53)
Q -.0012 .003 .0008 .0026 .0034 .0019
(−1.04) (2.57)a (1.26) (2.11)b (2.12)b (2.36)b
PRAT -.0374 -.1309 -.01 -.0622 -.022 -.0295
(−.8) (−2.86)a (−.35) (−1.49) (−.53) (−1.16)
CF .1528 .1111 .327 .0605 .1897 .4913 .0923 -.1643
(5.42)a (4.28)a (14.88)a (2.78)a (4.29)a (16.15)a (2.59)a (−4.38)a
R2 Within .137 .107 .206 .108 .157 .323
R2 Between .228 .192 .178 .015 .307 .314
R2 All .15 .123 .159 .078 .185 .26
GMM Independent Bank Group Diﬀerence
Parameters Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted IR-GR IU-GU
LAGIK .0643 -.1185 .0316 -.0065 .0301 -.0168
(.86) (−1.74)c (.87) (−.09) (.34) (−.47)
Q .0115 .0103 .0108 .0067 .0094 .0014
(2.35)b (1.82)c (3.53)a (1.57) (1.65)c (.51)
Qnf -.0019 -.0009 .0007 .0024 -.0002 .0047
(−.89) (−.37) (.4) (.98) (−.06) (2.58)a
CF .1792 .1544 .3262 .048 .3175 .5285 .1312 -.2023
(3.03)a (1.68)c (4.74)a (2.02)b (3.13)a (7.78)a (2.06)b (−2.09)b
PRAT .093 -.2147 -.0019 -.1443 -.0319 -.1338
(.91) (−2.19)b (−.03) (−1.54) (−.44) (2.19)b
Sargon Test .915 .899 .947 .97 .988 .911
M Test .99 .373 .865 .644 .968 .363
45Table 17: CF Sensitivity (Neg. Obs.), Keiretsu X Bond Elig. Division, 1980s
Table presents results on the standard cash ﬂow equation using OLS, ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, and Arellano-Bond GMM estimation. The dependent
variable is I/K. CONST is the target investment rate, Q is the coeﬃcient on Q and is the inverse of the adjustment cost parameter, Qnf
is the coeﬃcient on the non-fundamental portion of Q, LAGIK is the coeﬃcient on lagged I/K, PRAT is the coeﬃcient on the price ratio,
POS CF is the coeﬃcient on positive, and NEG CF is the coeﬃcient on negative cash ﬂow. Industry and time dummies are included in
the OLS regression,and time dummies in the ﬁxed-eﬀects and GMM regressions. The t statistics (OLS, FE) and z statistics (GMM) are in
parentheses, and are calculated with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (for OLS and GMM). The superscripts a, b, and c denote
signiﬁcance at the .01, .05, and .1 levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. The p − values of the Sargan and the M test (for second order serial
correlation) are presented for the GMM regression. The sample period is 1980-90.
OLS Independent Bank Group Diﬀerence
Parameters Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted IR-GR IU-GU
CONST .0416 .1501 .0665 .0945 .0142 .0672
(.68) (1.7)c (1.3) (1.42) (.18) (1.42)
Q -.0004 .0004 -.0009 -.0003 .0033 -.0006
(−.56) (.34) (−1.46) (−.26) (2.13)b (−.65)
PRAT .0048 -.0647 -.0035 -.0281 .0087 -.0306
(.16) (−1.4) (−.13) (−.78) (.22) (−1.24)
POS CF .2121 .2707 .213 .1322 .1944 .3112 .08 -.098
(4.19)a (5.32)a (10.45)a (2.56)b (3.09)a (11.12)a (1.11) (−2.87)a
NEG CF -.0334 -.038 -.0698 -.0192 .0898 .0921
(−.43) (−2.46)b (−1.48) (−.52) (1.87)c (1.41)
R2 .191 .22 .191 .178 .203 .298
Fixed Eﬀects Independent Bank Group Diﬀerence
Parameters Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted IR-GR IU-GU
CONST .1108 .2161 .0417 .1451 .0792 .0133
(1.53) (3.21)a (.92) (2.35)b (1.23) (.35)
Q -.001 .0021 .0008 .0025 .0033 .002
(−.93) (1.83)c (1.19) (2.01)b (2.03)b (2.4)b
PRAT -.0385 -.1079 -.0072 -.0606 -.028 -.0268
(−.83) (−2.37)b (−.25) (−1.46) (−.67) (−1.06)
POS CF .2084 .208 .3344 .1054 .2129 .5029 .103 -.169
(6.06)a (5.95)a (15.1)a (3.59)a (4.59)a (16.27)a (2.28)b (−4.43)a
NEG CF -.1497 -.0358 -.3126 -.0572 -.1249 -.2205
(−1.34) (−.81) (−1.11) (−1.02) (−.63) (−.62)
R2 Within .148 .131 .209 .116 .163 .326
R2 Between .191 .282 .173 .027 .28 .314
R2 All .156 .168 .158 .088 .183 .261
GMM Independent Bank Group Diﬀerence
Parameters Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted IR-GR IU-GU
LAGIK .06 -.1199 .0295 -.0072 .0351 -.0191
(.8) (−1.82)c (.82) (−.11) (.4) (−.53)
Q .0119 .0061 .0108 .0074 .0099 .0019
(2.43)b (1.24) (3.49)a (1.71)c (1.76)c (.69)
Qnf -.002 -.0012 .0003 .0028 .0004 .0046
(−.94) (−.47) (.17) (1.14) (.12) (2.54)b
POS CF .172 .3009 .3061 .185 .2955 .5162 -.013 -.21
(2.39)b (3.01)a (4.86)a (2.42)a (2.86)a (7.4)a (−.12) (−2.24)b
NEG CF .0616 -.0028 3.3625 -.1851 .129 1.3402
(.313) (−.05) (1.06) (−1.73)c (.34) (.76)
PRAT .0919 -.1773 -.013 -.1318 -.034 -.1373
(.91) (−1.71)c (−.18) (−1.43) (−.47) (2.25)b
Sargon Test .9 .886 .983 .94 .867 .92
M Test .998 .383 .935 .737 .715 .061
46Table 18: CF Sensitivity by Period, Keiretsu X Bond Elig. Division
Table presents results on the standard cash ﬂow equation using OLS, ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects, and Arellano-Bond GMM estimation. The dependent
variable is I/K. CONST is the target investment rate, Q is the coeﬃcient on Q and is the inverse of the adjustment cost parameter, Qnf is the
coeﬃcient on the non-fundamental portion of Q, LAGIK is the coeﬃcient on lagged I/K, PRAT is the coeﬃcient on the price ratio, and CF
is the coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow. Industry and time dummies are included in the OLS regression, and time dummies in the ﬁxed-eﬀects and GMM
regressions. The t statistics (OLS, FE) and z statistics (GMM) are in parentheses, and are calculated with heteroskedasticity consistent standard
errors (for OLS and GMM). The superscripts a, b, and c denote signiﬁcance at the .01, .05, and .1 levels of signiﬁcance, respectively. The
p−values of the Sargan and the M test (for second order serial correlation) are presented for the GMM regression. The sample period is 1980-96.
OLS Independent Bank Group Diﬀerence
Parameters Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted IR-GR IU-GU
CONST .1062 .2022 .151 .1448 .1333 .1
(2.93)a (4.55)a (5.27)a (2.94)a (2.52)b (3.82)a
Q -.001 0 -.0005 .0007 .003 .0001
(−1.3) (−.04) (−1.05) (.84) (2.2)b (.18)
PRAT -.0284 -.0932 -.0478 -.043 -.0475 -.0458
(−1.51) (−4.13)a (−3.17)a (−1.86)c (−1.83)c (−3.5)a
CF80−87 .1921 .2942 .2201 .0852 .1744 .3153 .1069 -.0952
(4.53)a (5.37)a (10.22)a (2.43)b (3.04)a (11.45)a (1.94)c (−2.72)a
CF88−90 .1912 .0837 .1786 .1062 .2128 .2606 .085 -.0820
(2.603)a (1.385) (5.829)a (1.376) (1.852)c (3.517)a (.8) (−.08)
CF91−93 .1516 .0884 .1298 .0401 .0739 .1838 .1115 -.0540
(2.19)b (1.35) (3.93)a (.78) (1.16) (3.15)a (1.29) (−.8)
CF94−96 .0905 .1654 .0806 .1081 .1543 .1105 -.0176 -.0299
(3.35)a (3.21)a (3.54)a (1.79)c (1.75)c (2.2)b (−.27) (−.54)
R2 .172 .193 .249 .174 .167 .283
Fixed Eﬀects Independent Bank Group Diﬀerence
Parameters Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted IR-GR IU-GU
CONST .1275 .1935 .118 .1388 .1246 .0501
(3.11)a (4.94)a (4.6)a (3.61)a (2.97)a (2.1)b
Q -.0014 .002 .0011 .0028 .003 .002
(−1.52) (2.11)b (2.12)b (2.69)a (2.05)b (2.9)a
PRAT -.043 -.0986 -.0448 -.0503 -.054 -.0346
(−1.71)c (−3.97)a (−2.92)a (−2.01)b (−2.21)b (−2.44)b
CF80−87 .1718 .2481 .2809 .0537 .1816 .4101 .1181 -.1292
(5.2)a (7.14)a (14.61)a (2.01)b (3.88)a (15.54)a (2.78)a (−3.96)a
CF88−90 .2073 .074 .2254 .0937 .2307 .3749 .1136 -.1495
(4.57)a (2.37)b (9.58)a (2.15)b (3.59)a (8.96)a (1.8)c (−3.12)a
CF91−93 .1719 .0901 .1889 .0129 .0748 .2437 .1590 -.0548
(3.36)a (3.43)a (6.94)a (.3) (1.41) (5.84)a (2.38)b (−1.1)
CF94−96 .0718 .1514 .1198 .0982 .1658 .1739 -.0264 -.0541
(1.51) (2.81)a (5.36)a (2.61)a (2.42)b (5.01)a (−.43) (−1.31)
R2 Within .159 .174 .264 .145 .154 .306
R2 Between .147 .152 .195 .006 .209 .232
R2 All .157 .164 .23 .119 .153 .255
GMM Independent Bank Group Diﬀerence
Parameters Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted Restricted Semi-Res. Unrestricted IR-GR IU-GU
LAGIK .022 .0311 .0572 .0259 .0475 .062
(.44) (.68) (2.1)b (.73) (.98) (2.23)b
Q .0069 .0062 .0061 .0076 .0115 .0046
(1.69)c (2.49)b (3.28)a (2.39)b (2.86)a (2.06)b
Qnf -.0025 -.0013 -.0003 .0043 .0022 .0018
(−1.62) (−.83) (−.24) (3.15)a (.86) (1.58)
CF80−87 .2622 .2395 .2712 .084 .3214 .4003 .1782 -.1291
(4.03)a (2.69)a (5.75)a (1.65)c (3.64)a (7.57)a (2.16)b (−1.82)c
CF88−90 .2897 .1094 .2387 .1146 .2753 .3704 .1751 -.1317
(3.62)a (1.11) (4.06)a (1.44) (3.45)a (4.73)a (1.55) (−1.35)
CF91−93 .1879 .1003 .1961 .101 .0203 .2277 .0869 -.0316
(2.45)b (1.5) (4.59)a (1.81)c (.35) (2.18)b (.91) (−.28)
CF94−96 .0854 .1735 .1691 .0642 .1514 .1979 .0212 -.0288
(1.98)b (2.66)a (2.98)a (.89) (1.69)c (2.37)b (.25) (−.29)
PRAT -.0292 -.1342 -.0993 -.0978 -.0329 -.0374
(−.57) (−2.95)a (−3.12)a (−2.64)a (−.82) (−1.56)
Sargon Test .918 .87 .84 .95 .93 .901
M Test .659 .638 .347 .739 .918 .618
47Figure 1: Distribution of Net Real I/K
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Figure 2: Distribution of Tobin’s Average Q
 
o=mean, +=median, .=10,30,70,90 percentiles
Fiscal Year





48Figure 3: Distribution of Total Loan Growth From Domestic Banks
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49Figure 4: Mean Outstanding Bonds/TL
Figure displays the mean outstanding bonds divided by total liabilities for R, S, and U ﬁrm groups.
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Figure 5: Mean Bank Debt/TL
Figure displays the mean total bank debt divided by total liabilities for R, S, and U ﬁrm groups.
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50Figure 6: Mean Total Assets (Y10,000)
Figure displays the mean total assets (in Y10,000) for IR, IU, GR, and GU ﬁrm groups. Industry
means are subtracted oﬀ to control for possible composition eﬀects.
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Figure 7: Mean Earnings per Share
Figure displays the mean earnings per share for IR, IU, GR, and GU ﬁrm groups. Industry means
are subtracted oﬀ to control for possible composition eﬀects.
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51Figure 8: Mean Before-Tax Proﬁts/TA
Figure displays the mean before tax proﬁts divided by total assets for IR, IU, GR, and GU ﬁrm
groups. Industry means are subtracted oﬀ to control for possible composition eﬀects.
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Figure 9: Mean Value Added/TA
Figure displays the mean value added for IR, IU, GR, and GU ﬁrm groups. Industry means are
subtracted oﬀ to control for possible composition eﬀects. Value added is calculated according to the
method laid out in Keiei Bunseki Handbook (1987).
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52Figure 10: Year-by-Year Coeﬃcients on CF1 (no land)
Figure displays the year-by-year coeﬃcients on CF1 in OLS regressions of I/K on PRAT, price
adjusted Q and Q squared, a dummy for bond issues, cash ﬂow deﬁned as CF1, and a full set of
industry dummies. Investment does not include land and the numerator of Q is adjusted to reﬂect this.
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Figure 11: Year-by-Year Coeﬃcients on CF1 (land)
Figure displays the year-by-year coeﬃcients on CF1 in OLS regressions of I/K on PRAT, price
adjusted Q and Q squared, a dummy for bond issues, cash ﬂow deﬁned as CF1, and a full set of
industry dummies. The investment rate includes the market value of land.
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